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Introduction
Several months back, as this Report was being conceived, 
protests in Hong Kong showed no sign of abating, with yellow 
umbrellas and balaclavas saturating global media. Today, as 
the coronavirus crisis takes its heavy toll, fear and restrictive 
measures have been keeping almost three million people away 
from the streets, both in Hong Kong and elsewhere in the 
world. And yet, just like at the start of what has now come to be 
known as the 2019 “global protest wave”, Hong Kong remains 
at the frontline of political contestation worldwide.
If questioned, most people today would assume that the 
Hong Kong protests ceased as swiftly as they had started. They 
would be wrong. In truth, the protests never entirely died out, 
not even when the first cases of coronavirus infection were 
registered in Wuhan last December, nor when the World Health 
Organization declared a pandemic in early March. Indeed, 
as Joshua Wong, leader of the 2014 “Umbrella Movement”, 
claimed, Hong Kong is fighting an “infinity war”, which the 
coronavirus fuelled instead of halting. It is therefore high time 
to go back to the reasons for the current unrest.
“One country, two systems”. This was the catchphrase 
chosen for the political solution proposed by President Deng 
Xiaoping in 1979 to secure the return of Hong Kong under 
China’s sovereignty, after having been a UK protectorate since 
1841. The formula is a carefully crafted compromise. On the 
one hand, China and Hong Kong are recognised as a single 
state; on the other, Hong Kong has the right to manage 
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certain policy areas in accordance with a different institutional 
order and economic system. This means that the Hong Kong 
government is responsible for domestic affairs, including the 
judiciary, immigration and customs, public finance, currencies 
and extradition. Diplomatic relations and military defence, in 
contrast,  remain under the responsibility of Beijing. Yet, “one 
country, two systems” also has a deadline after which Hong 
Kong will lose its “privileges” – that is, 1 July 2047.
In Hong Kong, the protests against the 2019 extradition 
law unearthed the main weaknesses of the “one country, 
two systems” formula, especially as Beijing has grown more 
assertive over time. Violent contestations arose out of fear 
that the extradition law would cross the dividing line between 
Hong Kong and mainland China – a line that has already been 
crossed in the past. Over and over, people have taken to the 
streets to voice their concerns for Beijing’s growing interference 
in the city’s internal affairs (among others, candidates for the 
general elections are still pre-approved by Beijing), as well as 
to confront the Hong Kong government about its compliance 
with mainland China’s requests. In sum, Hongkongers protest 
against a government that they feel does not protect their own 
interests, but is aligned with Beijing. Therefore, protests will 
not cease until the city’s post-2047 future will be made clear. 
Yet, protesters do not look necessarily for independence, but 
for a different compromise, which is made impossible by the 
key role that Hong Kong plays in financial markets worldwide, 
and also in Beijing’s plans for the creation of a major advanced 
development area (the “Greater Bay Area”) capable of rivalling 
with other metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo or San Francisco, 
and sensibly increase China’s status around the world. 
Furthermore, Hong Kong is strongly dependent on mainland 
China in terms of its economic prosperity. After the prolonged 
2019 protests weakened the city’s economy, traditionally 
vulnerable to external shocks, the coronavirus is now sure to 
prolong Hong Kong’s recession. At the height of the protests 
(between July and December 2019), the city’s economy had 
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shrunk about 3% compared to the same period in 2018. Overall, 
GDP in 2019 contracted by 1.2%, the first drop since the global 
financial crisis. But the coronavirus pandemic is sure to take a 
much heavier toll, not only due to Hong Kong’s dependency 
from China, but also because of its export-oriented character, 
traditionally sensitive to trade disruptions. Predictably, in the 
first quarter of 2020, Hong Kong’s economy shrank by 8.9%, 
worse than during the 2009 global financial crisis or the 1998 
Asian financial crisis.
As anywhere else in the world, the Hong Kong government 
has adopted a number of measures to reduce the impact of 
the virus. Regulations on human mobility to and from the 
mainland have proven the most controversial as much as they 
precipitated tensions between the Hong Kong government 
and civil society. Many asked for the closure of all connecting 
routes between the city and mainland China, so as to avoid 
the spread of the virus. Hong Kong’s Chief executive Carrie 
Lam, though, chose to leave open four passageways, despite 
banning most non-residents, including tourists, from entering 
Hong Kong. Closing all routes, in fact, even at the time of a 
health emergency, would be a symbolic gesture referring back 
to “localism” – i.e., the ideology that underlies Hong Kong’s 
more radical autonomy claims. Although the city’s government 
has done a credible job in containing the infections, it is not 
getting credit because the level of trust from civil society is at 
an all-time low. The risk is that the policies adopted by the 
Hong Kong government will only be interpreted as “political 
choices”, and will lead to a new wave of severe protests after 
the coronavirus crisis will end. After all, protests already started 
to mount, despite the anti-coronavirus measures, and in late 
March the police fired tear gas to disperse about 100 protesters. 
Contention is once again stirring in the city and Hong Kong 
might be on the verge of another “summer of protests” unless 
the health crisis kicks in once more.
This ISPI report delves deep into longstanding Hong Kong-
China relations, asking: what makes Hong Kong special? To 
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what extent have the Hong Kong protests worsened over time? 
Will the city’s role in Beijing’s development plans in the area 
change, if the protests continue? After all, not even a global 
health crisis has managed to halt Hong Kongers to take their 
concerns to the streets. We then ask: how could the future of 
mainland China-Hong Kong relations change, as we slowly get 
closer to the expiry date of the  city’s autonomous status, in 
2047? And finally, to what extent has the situation in Hong 
Kong the potential to reverberate on Macau and ultimately 
Taiwan?
In the first chapter, Guido Samarani looks at Hong Kong’s 
instabilities as a product of history, and especially as a clash 
between the city’s past as a British colony and its controversial 
relations with mainland China. This mixed heritage created a 
unique “Hong Kong identity”, which is mainly responsible for 
Hong Kongers’ inability to accept Beijing’s full-sovereignty.
Next, Alvin Y.H. Cheung details the controversial relations 
between Hong Kong and Beijing. In particular, he investigates 
changes in the governmental approaches used to counter 
protests. After the 2014 protests, Cheung detects a sensible 
increase in the levels of violence used by Beijing, and argues that, 
as long as protests continue, violence will also risk escalating.
Éric Sautedé offers a comparison between the 2014 and 
2019 Hong Kong protests. By looking at the “anatomy” of 
these two events, the author questions Beijing’s policy choices, 
and asks whether this streak of violence will work in favour of 
the governments of Hong Kong and Beijing, or whether it will 
open up new spaces for contestation in the long run.
Victoria Hui, in contrast, looks at the Hong Kong protests 
as something more than a product of Beijing and Hong Kong 
relations. As the 2020 Taiwan presidential elections have shown 
in January, the situation in Hong Kong remains a key political 
issue in Macau and Taiwan, as well. In fact, the outcome of 
the crisis in Hong Kong is bound to impact future relations 
between Beijing and other contested territories.
Introduction 11
Yet, uncertainties on Hong Kong’s political future 
complement doubts on the city’s ability to continue serving 
Beijing’s economic and financial interests. Alicia García-
Herrero and Gary Ng look at Hong Kong’s position worldwide, 
especially under the confrontation between China and the US. 
Hong Kong’s connecting status between China and the West is 
crucial for the city’s role as a global financial hub, and its loss 
risks damaging the mainland’s economic strategy.
In their chapter, Dingding Chen and Junmin Wang focus 
on the Greater Bay Area, one of Beijing’s main development 
projects involving Hong Kong. The authors argue that 
structural differences in how mainland China and Hong Kong 
are administered risk to be fatal to the project, thus jeopardizing 
Beijing’s efforts to tighten its grasp on the region.
Finally, Alessia Amighini makes a case for Beijing’s attempt 
to complement Hong Kong’s role as a financial hub with other 
locations, above all Shanghai. Amighini argues that Hong 
Kong will remain one of the strongholds of China’s financial 
power, yet losing its unicity to a strategy of differentiation, 
implemented through the Belt and Road Initiative.
In conclusion, relations between Hong Kong and mainland 
China are set to remain highly complicated over the next years 
and decades, but they do not need to become confrontational. 
Dialogue will only set in if the two parties understand and 
acknowledge each other’s grievances, while not embracing them 
altogether. Mediation can come from international partners, 
but ultimately only front-liners will be able to tackle the issue 
effectively. And while de-escalation efforts are welcome, some 
level of conflict may even prove beneficial to showing how 
deeply each side cares for a solution. Whether this may serve 
to bring both sides to the negotiating table, and from here to a 
sustainable solution, only time will tell.
Paolo Magri
ISPI Executive Vice President and Director
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1.  Hong Kong and China: 
     A Controversial Historical Relationship 
Guido Samarani
Looking back at the mid-nineteenth century – as the “Opium 
Wars” opened a century of Western aggression against China 
and the island of Hong Kong was ceded to the United Kingdom 
through the 1842 “Treaty of Nanjing” – it is impressive how 
that “barren island” (as then-British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Henry John Temple Palmerston, used to refer to Hong Kong) 
managed to become East Asia’s financial hub in the twentieth 
century.
In less than two centuries, the island – together with the 
Kowloon Peninsula and the New Territories – experienced a 
long and complex period of colonisation and, after returning to 
China in July 1997, a stimulating yet contradictory relationship 
with Beijing.1 
This chapter will provide a very essential overview of Hong 
Kong’s modern history, especially looking at relations with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1997 and 
focusing on major turning-points.
1 The reference to Lord Palmerston is in F. Welsh, A History of  Kong, London, 
HarperCollins, 1993, p. 1; see also among others: J.M. Carroll, A Concise History 
of  Hong Kong, Hong Kong, HKU, 2007; S. Tsang, A Modern History of  Hong Kong, 
London-New York, Tauris, 2004; T.Y. Fu-Lai, “From a ‘Barren Rock’ to the 
Financial Hub of  East Asia: Hong Kong’s Economic Transformation in the 
Coordinating Perspective”, Asia Pacific Business Review, vol. 10, no. 3-4, 2003-2004, 
pp, 360-381; J.M. Brown and R. Foot (eds.), Hong Kong’s Transitions, 1842-1997, 
London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
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Introducing Colonial Hong Kong and 
the Japanese Occupation 
According to John M. Carroll (2007), the impact of British 
colonial rule should not be underestimated when attempting 
to understand Hong Kong, despite China’s influence. Indeed, 
colonialism changed Hong Kong’s historical development, 
shaped the encounters between China and the UK, as well as 
power relations between the two. Nowadays, small Chinese 
shops sit comfortably on streets named after British royalty 
or colonial administrators, while British law, Christianity, and 
modern Western medicine coexist with traditional Chinese 
medicine, several hundred Chinese temples, and a plethora of 
religious festivals and ceremonies. Such a relationship produced 
a Chinese community in Hong Kong that often considers itself 
“special” and different from its counterpart in Mainland China.
Hong Kong’s status as a British colony and a free port 
transformed it into a thriving commercial centre. Rule of 
law and political stability encouraged Chinese and foreign 
investments, while colonial status protected Hong Kong 
from the many issues that plagued China in nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As Carrol argues, any assessment of 
British colonial legacy must consider the entire colonial period 
rather than focus on the last decade of British rule, when last-
minute political reforms were introduced, such as the so-called 
“1992 Constitutional Package” which Chris Patten revealed 
shortly after he took appointment as Governor of Hong Kong 
(lowering minimum voting age, abolition of all appointed seats 
in the Municipal Counsils and Districts Boards, introduction 
of new functional constituency seats, etc.). 
Although colonial Hong Kong was theoretically administered 
through rule of law, some observers argue that common 
law never took root on the island because of considerable 
differences with China’s traditional legal system (for instance, 
independent judiciary, the influence of Confucianism’s moral 
behaviour concepts on the legal culture. Furthermore, the 
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British government had enacted several anti-Chinese laws 
since the earliest years of colonial rule, and had passed various 
emergency and discriminatory ordinances as well as censored 
the Chinese press.2 
Leo Goodstadt, who led the “Central Policy Unit” – a 
governemental institute established in 1989 with the aim of 
analyzing options and recommending solutions in particular 
for the chief executive – between 1989 and 1997, maintains 
that at the heart of the colonial system in Hong Kong was a 
strange paradox: British rulers were an alien racial and cultural 
group residing at the top of the social, economic, and political 
hierarchy. They were agents of a foreign power, whose presence 
was a constant reminder of China’s past humiliations at the 
hand of Western imperialists. A crucial question of Hong Kong’s 
colonial history was the fact that the colonial administration 
was nothing more than a UK agent, and colonial officials 
simply implemented instructions coming from London. Also, 
British rule was founded on an alliance between colonialism 
and capitalism throughout the colonial era. The British thus 
aimed to contain and control political participation. Instead 
of democratic elections, it was the colonial administration that 
selected the community’s representatives that almost exclusively 
came from business and professional sectors. During the first 
120 years of British rule, corruption prevailed, and only in the 
last two decades of the colonial era, the British managed to rule 
the people of Hong Kong with an honest government.3
Generally speaking, historiographical debates are linked to 
the role played by the three main “schools” of Hong Kong’s 
2 J.M. Carroll (2007), pp. 1-7.
3 L.F. Goodstadt, Uneasy Partners: The Conflict Between Public Interest and Private Profit 
in Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 2005; see also among others: J.C. 
Hsiung (ed.), Hong Kong the Super Paradox: Life After Return to China, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 2000; Tak-wing Ngo, “Hong Kong under Colonial Rule: An 
Introduction”, special issue of  China Information, vol. XII, no. 1-2, 1997, pp. 
1-11; Ming K. Chan, “The Legacy of  the British Administration of  Hong Kong: 
A View from Hong Kong”, The China Quarterly, vol. 151, September 1997, pp. 
567-582.
Hong Kong and China: A Controversial Historical Relationship 17
historical experience. First, the “colonial school” stresses the 
leading role of “white people”, and considers the Chinese only 
as a homogenous mass, showing criminal tendencies. Second, 
the “post-1949 Marxist school”, which catched only after 1997, 
develops a narrative of colonial exploitation and oppression, 
where the Chinese are victims of European aggression. Post-
1949 Marxists take the “Opium Wars” as a vital starting 
point, as a symbol of “National Humiliation”. Yet, the views, 
actions and feelings of Hong Kongers are barely mentioned. 
Finally, the “Hong Kong school” looks not only at growth and 
progress but also at conflict and change, raising issues of race, 
class, gender and the sensitive topic of a Hong Kong identity.4 
The period spanning from December 1941 to August 1945 
is usually described as “the darkest of Hong Kong’s history 
in the Second World War”, as it was marked by the Japanese 
imperial army’s occupation. In this period, Hong Kong suffered 
from the ravages of war, and fear and helplessness permeated 
everyday life. A large number of Mainlanders had come to 
Hong Kong during the “War of Resistance against Japan”, and 
Hong Kong’s population grew from 840,000 in 1936 to 1.6 
million in 1941 right before the Japanese occupation. 270,000 
refugees lived on the streets. Food, medical care, employment, 
and people’s daily lives were severely affected. The Hong Kong 
government accelerated the evacuation of foreign nationals and 
the formation of civilian defense forces such as the “Volunteer 
Defense Corps” and the “Police Reserve”. In December 1941, 
Japanese aircraft bombed Kai Tak Airport and other areas of the 
Kowloon Peninsula and the Hong Kong island. The Kowloon 
Peninsula and the New Territories fell into the hands of the 
Japanese on 12 December, and on the 18th Japanese troops 
4 The above very essential overview is largely based on: Hong Kong History Project: 
Rethinking a City’s History, based at the University Bristol, Project Director: Robert 
Bickers, “Hong Kong History Project”; see also C. Yik-yi Chu, “Back to the 
Masses: The Historiography of  Hong Kong’s Recent Political Developments and 
the Prospects of  Future Scholarship”, American Journal of  Chinese Studies, vol. 10, 
no. 1, April 2003, pp. 29-42.
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landed in Hong Kong island. The Governor surrendered to the 
Japanese shortly afterwards on Christmas day.
During the occupation, Japan intended to make Hong 
Kong its permanent domain. Then, the district administrative 
organization of Honk Kong was re-named using the Japanese 
system, and the Japanese Administration promoted the “Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, a kind of supranational 
framework whose aim was to create in Asian countries a new 
order which would ensure Japanese political and industrial 
hegemony. Several streets, places, and buildings were given 
Japanese names, and the Japanese Administration tried to instill 
the ethics and values of the Japanese Empire among the Chinese 
in Hong Kong. In order to promote the “Yamato culture”, the 
Japanese language was used in organisations, institutes, and 
schools. Students attending primary and secondary school were 
forced to learn Japanese and Japan’s national history. 
Three years and eight months into the “dark period”, Hong 
Kong’s population drastically dwindled from 1.6 million to 
600,000. Over one quarter of all the houses were destroyed in 
the war. The city was devastated: industrial and commercial 
activities were curtailed, and time passed slowly for the citizens. 
As a response, the occupation generated resistance, which 
took two main forms: a) some Communist-inspired resistance, 
mainly in the New Territories; and b)  the “British Army Aid 
Group” (BAAG), organised as a unit of the British Army and 
operating in South China. The occupation ended in August 
1945, and the British forces returned in Hong Kong at the end 
of the month.5
5 On the period of  Japanese occupation see among others: P. Snow, The Fall of  
Hong Kong: Britain, China and the Japanese Occupation, New Haven and London, Yale 
UP, 2003; K. Miyahira, The Japanese Occupation of  Hong Kong: The Strategic Importance 
of  Hong Kong and the Details of  the Japanese Military Rule, Thesis discussed in January 
2017.
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After the Second World War: The Establishment 
and Early Years of the PRC
Generally speaking, we can detect a remarkable continuity in 
Hong Kong’s role in the international economy, since its origin 
as a commercial entrepot for China’s regional and global trade. 
A role that for many aspects the island still plays today. From 
a relatively unpopulated territory at the start of the nineteenth 
century, Hong Kong has grown to become one of the most 
important international financial centers in the world, thanks 
to the island’s rapid and successful process of industrialisation 
in the 1950s.
The large influx of refugees that arrived in Hong Kong in 
the late 1940s was transformed by the colonial administration 
into a demographic bonus, as they were all allowed to work 
freely and become a part of the Hong Kongese community. 
These refugees, especially coming from Shanghai, gave a big 
boost to some industries, such as textile and shipping, thanks 
to the management skills and the knowhow they demonstrated.
During the Chinese Civil War (1947-49), Hong Kong 
suffered from the effects of a trade slowdown around the 
world and, particularly, in China. However, to the benefit of 
Hong Kong, the Mainland’s problems diverted business and 
entrepreneurs from Shanghai and other Chinese cities to the 
safety and stability of the British colonial port of Hong Kong.
After the PRC was established in 1949, the Mainland isolated 
from the international economy, and Hong Kong was vital to 
maintain the international economic relations that supported 
the industrialisation and grain imports of the PRC. Even under 
the period of “self-sufficiency” of the 1960s, Hong Kong’s 
imports of food and water from the Mainland were a crucial 
source of foreign exchange earnings, which ensured that Hong 
Kong remained useful to the PRC. In turn, cheap food helped 
to mitigate rising living costs on the island, thus maintaining 
low wages during labor-intensive industrialisation. The island’s 
industrialisation is traditionally set to begin in the 1950s: there 
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was first the textile sector, and industry only diversified in the 
1960s in clothing, electronics, plastics and other labor-intensive 
productive sectors.
Politically, since the 1950s, the PRC seemed to be 
conscious that a foreign-run Hong Kong was best serving its 
interests. This policy was summarised as “long-term planning, 
full exploitation”, thus meaning that taking Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty back was not urgent, and that the island’s colonial 
status was maximising national interests.6
The Cultural Revolution and the 1967 Hong Kong 
Riots
During its first twenty-five years of existence, the PRC overcame 
enormous difficulties and suffered massive unrest. Above all, 
the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-62) crippled China’s economy 
and caused a devastating famine. Started in the mid-1960s, the 
“Cultural Revolution” – a radical movement launched by Mao 
Zedong in order to renew the spirit of the Chinese revolution 
and assure a new leadership of the Communist Party of China 
(CCP) more faithful to his current thinking – unleashed 
political factionalism, which affected every quarter of Chinese 
society and further damaged the economy. By contrast, in those 
years, Hong Kong enjoyed a strong economy and the city’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew extensively: between 
1961 and 1981, Hong Kong’s “economic growth was faster 
than in any other Asian country and much faster than that of 
Western industralised countries”.7
6 See among others: C.R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre: 
Emergence and Development, 1945-1965, London, Routledge, 2001; P. Roberts and 
J.M. Carroll (eds.), Hong Kong in the Cold War, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 2016; 
Law Yuk-fun, “Hong Kong”, China at War: An Encyclopedia, ed. Xiaobing Li, 
Santa Barbara-Denver-Oxford, ABC-CLIO, 2012, pp. 163-164.
7 Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department, Estimates of  Gross Domestic 
Product 1966-1976, Hong Kong Government Press, 1978; Lueng Chuen Chau, 
“Hong Kong: A Unique Case of  Development”, in D.M. Leipziger (ed.), Lessons 
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In this context, what was later called a “watershed” or a 
“hot summer” occurred: riots started in May 1967 at a plastic 
flower factory in Kowloon, and leftist demonstrators ended up 
besieging the Government House for several days.
The peak was reached after the British and Hong Kong 
governments – understanding that Beijing had no intention 
to exploit the situation and take back the colony by force – 
declined to accept the leftist demands and handled the protests 
with a heavy hand. In early July, the “Sha Kau Tok Incident” 
occurred at a village close to Shenzhen, located in the province 
of Guangdong, during which demostrators launched bomb 
attacks against the authorities. In August, the Chinese Red 
Guards attacked the British diplomatic compound in Beijing. 
This second event signed the final act of the 1967 riots. 
Four years later, Yao Tengshang (a diplomat who was also a 
member of the revolutionary group that controlled China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) faced a mass trial in Beijing, and 
was imprisoned for his part in the 1967 attacks on the British 
diplomatic compound and other foreign embassies.8
Beijing and London Towards the Handover
In May 1975, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping met with then 
British Prime Minister Edward Heath, who had visited China 
the year before and would later become one of the country’s 
“old friends”. Remembering those days, Qi Pengfei stressed 
that regarding Hong Kong Mao said to Heath: “We will not 
discuss it at present. We shall consult together at the proper 
from East Asia, Ann Arbor, The University of  Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 35-81 
(quotation at p. 36).
8 See among others: G. Ka-wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed: The 1967 Riots, 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 2009; R. Yep, “The 1967 Riots in Hong Kong: 
The Diplomatic and Domestic Fronts of  the Colonial Governor”, The China 
Quarterly, vol. 193, March 2008, pp. 122-139; R. Bickers and R. Yep (eds.), May 
Days in Hong Kong. Riot and Emergency in 1967, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 2009; 
“Key Chinese Official Reported in Prison”, New York Times, 21 June 1971.
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time about what we are going to do. This will be the business of 
the younger generation”.9 Qi had served as China’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs between 1972 and 1974, and played a leading 
role in the subsequent negotiations between London and 
Beijing for the return of Hong Kong to China.
After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping often indicated that China’s 
modernisation could benefit from Hong Kong’s assistance, 
especially in areas like finance, technology and management. 
Deng wanted to be prepared before touching upon the issue of 
“sovereignty”. Indeed, while meeting Youe-Kong Pao (one of 
the richest man on the island at the time) in late 1978, Deng 
stressed the key role that Hong Kong businesspersons would 
play in creating a modern China.10
On 22 September 1982, British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher arrived in Beijing. She first met with Prime Minister 
Zhao Ziyang, and then had a meeting with Deng. Some days 
later, while in Hong Kong, she said to Hong Kong Governor 
Sir Edward Youde and some high officials that “the Chinese 
have taken their familiar position on sovereignty” and that 
“the main difficulty with the Chinese was to persuade them 
that the maintenance of prosperity and stability… depended 
on the British administration”. The “Iron Lady” continued by 
indicating that
the Chinese had no understanding of international finance and 
the concept of freedom under an ascertainable system of law. The 
problem in the talks would be to get across that these things were 
essential for maintaining confidence in Hong Kong and every 
possible form of help from Hong Kong would be needed in this.11 
9 Qi Pengfei, Deng Xiaoping yu Xianggang huigui (Deng Xiaoping and the return of  
Hong Kong), Beijing, Huaxia chubanshe, 2004; the quotation is from “Talk with 
Edward Heath”, China.org.cn, 25 May 1974.
10 E.F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of  China, Cambridge, Mass-
London, Harvard UP, 2011, pp. 487-495.
11 “Record of  a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and Officials of  the 
Executive Council of  Hong Kong on 26 September 1982 at Government House 
in Hong Kong”, Margaret Thatcher Foundation, Archive.
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In Deng’s opinion, the question of sovereignty was not open 
to discussion. The President did not want to become like Li 
Hongzhang, who was remembered only because he had signed 
unequal treaties.12 According to Hong Kong-based journalist 
and writer Frank Ching, the decision to take back Hong Kong 
was made by China’s Politburo back in December 1981.13
Whatever the story, after Thatcher’s visit, negotiations were 
delayed. According to Governor Youde and Sir Percy Cradock 
– British Ambassador to the PRC and the “architect” of the 
negotiations that eventually led to the signing of the “Sino-
British Joint Declaration” (JD)14 –, Beijing was determined to 
announce a plan for Hong Kong in 1983-84.15
Thus, in merely a few months, the situation radically 
changed: Sino-British negotiations took off in mid-1983 
and, on 19 December 1984, the JD was signed in Beijing.16 
Basically, the JD – which was referred to as “a fascinating case of 
international legal regime formation, rather than merely treaty 
making”17 – comprises several documents: the JD itself, three 
annexes, as well as an exchange of memoranda.
In the JD, the government of the PRC declared that it would 
resume sovereignty over Hong Kong on 1 July 1997, while the 
UK government declared that it would restore Hong Kong to 
the PRC on the same day. Among other things, the JD sets out 
12 E.F. Vogel (2011), p. 496.
13 F. Ching, “Looking Back: How London and Beijing Decided the Fate of  Hong 
Kong”, Hong Kong Journal Archive, April 2010.
14 For the full text see: The Government of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, The Joint Declaration (Full 
Text).
15 R, Cottrell, The End of  Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of  Imperial Retreat, 
London, J. Murray, 1993.
16 For an overview of  the process of  negotiation within the general context of  
those years see J.W. Garver, China’s Quest. The History of  the Foreign Relations of  the 
People’s Republic of  China, New York, Oxford University Press, 2016, Chapter 22.
17 R. Mushkat, “The Dynamics of  Legal Regime Formation: The Sino.British 
Declaration on the Question of  Hong Kong Revisited: A Rejoinder to Kevin 
Tan”, The European Journal of  International Law, vol. 22, no. 4, 2011, pp. 1149-1152.
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the basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. Under the 
principle of “One Country, Two Systems”, the socialist system 
and its policies would not applied to Hong Kong, and the 
island’s previous capitalist system and life-style would remain 
unchanged for 50 years. The deadline was set to 2047. The JD 
also provided that these policies would have been stipulated in 
the “Basic Law” (BL).
The BL was adopted on 4 April 1990 by the Seventh National 
People’s Congress (NPC) of the PRC, and came into effect on 1 
July 1997. It is a constitutional document for Hong Kong, and 
is articulated in the following sections:
• The body of the BL that comprises nine chapters and 
160 articles;
• The first annex that lists the selection criteria for the 
election of Hong Kong’s Chief Executive;
• The second annex that lists the criteria for the forma-
tion of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council and its voting 
procedures;
• The third annex that lists the national laws that are to be 
applied Hong Kong.
The BL was drafted by a mixed Committee composed of Hong 
Kongers and Mainlanders. A BL Consultative Committee 
exclusively including Hong Kongers was established in 1985 to 
present the island’s views. 
The first draft was published in April 1988, followed by a 
five-month exercise of public consultation. The second draft was 
published in February 1989, and the subsequent consultation 
period ended eight months later. The Basic Law was formally 
promulgated on 4 April 1990 by the NPC, together with the 
designs for Hong Kong’s flag and emblem.18
18 See The Government of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 
Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, The Joint Declaration (Full Text), cit. 
and the Basic Law homepage.
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In “Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law”,19 Danny 
Gittings (2016) indicates that as the BL is a product of 
an international agreement as well as a domestic law valid 
throughout China and regulating Hong Kong’s relations with 
the Mainland, it is difficult to define. In addition, as far as Hong 
Kong is concerned, the BL also acts as a Constitution: it sets 
out Hong Kong’s political structure and the rights and duties of 
its residents. Thus, the BL has an international, a domestic and 
a constitutional dimension.
• The international dimension. The BL’s internationality 
stems from the 1984 “Joint Declaration on the Question 
of Hong Kong”, a document that is generally recog-
nised to act as an international treaty (although it does 
not present the word “treaty” in the title). Beijing never 
was comfortable with the BL maintaining an interna-
tional dimension. From 2014, attempts were made to 
renegotiate the applicability of the JD to the period that 
goes from its signing to its coming into force. In this 
way, the purpose of the JD would only have been that 
of regulating the process of Hong Kong’s return under 
China’s sovereignty, and any international dimension 
would come to an end. What is paramount, for Beijing, 
is the domestic dimension of the BL, thus meaning that 
it operates only as a national law that applies to Hong 
Kong and the rest of China.
• The domestic dimension. Being a national law, the BL 
sets down rules that govern the relationship between 
Hong Kong and the rest of the country, which are 
also valid for the highest bodies of the Chinese state. 
Several provisions set out the powers that can be exer-
cised by China’s central authorities such as the NPC, 
its Standing Committee and the national government. 
They include, for instance, control over Hong Kong’s 
19 D. Gittings, Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong, Hong Kong UP, 
2016 (second edition).
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defence and foreign affairs, the power to appoint the 
Chief Executive and the main officials of the island, 
as well as reject certain laws if incompatible with the 
BL. These provisions also set limits on the ability of the 
Chinese authorities, at the local and national level, to 
interfere in Hong Kong affairs. For instance, they de-
termine the types of national laws that can be applied, 
as well as the circumstances under which Hong Kong 
laws can be invalidated as incompatible with the BL. 
Interference from the part of any branch of the Chinese 
government, either at a local or a national level, in the 
affairs that Hong Kong administers autonomously is 
also prohibited, in particular in almost all types of lo-
cal affairs including, for instance, the extension of land 
leases, Hong Kong’s economic and taxation policies, its 
handling of shipping and routine civil aviation issues, 
etc. The special status of the BL in the Chinese legal 
system is also reflected in the provisions that make it 
more difficult to amend than any other law in China.
• The constitutional dimension. The domestic dimension 
of the BL as a national law has occasionally raised doubts 
about whether it has a constitutional dimension at all – 
a conclusion that threatens to undermine the extent to 
which the BL protects Hong Kong’s autonomy. Simply 
put, the BL fits the definition of a Constitution: its pro-
visions make it clear that the BL constitutes a source of 
law that prevails over others. According to some differ-
ent interpretations, though, if the BL cannot be defined 
as a Constitution in itself, it still plays a constitutional 
role in supplementing the national constitution when it 
is applied in Hong Kong.20
In the past decades, both the JD and the BL have been 
commented upon and analysed. During the protests that 
20 The three points briefly discussed above are from ibid, chapter 3. 
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rocked Hong Kong (2019-20), questions were raised about 
their meaning and content.21 The main issues raised focused 
on the high degree of autonomy and executive, legislative and 
independent judicial power enjoyed by Hong Kong; whether 
the laws that were previously in force in Hong Kong (that is, the 
common law) should be maintained; the relationship between 
China’s central authorities and Hong Kong; the protection of 
individual rights and personal freedoms; and Hong Kong’s 
political structure.
One important point is that the power to interpret the BL 
resides with the Standing Committee of the NPC, which needs 
to authorise Hong Kong’s courts to interpret the BL on their 
own, and adjudicate cases. Also, the power to amend the BL 
remains with the NPC, and no amendment should contravene 
the established basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong. 
Special attention should also be paid to the impact of the 
1989 “Beijing Spring” on Hong Kong and its relations with 
the PRC (in terms of socio-political reactions, and historical 
memory). An impressive amount of works and comments have 
been produced, stressing how the 1989 events, their history and 
memory, still have an impact on young people in Hong Kong 
and shape their views on the Chinese government.22 However, 
it should be stressed that the relation between civil unrest and 
21 For radical different approaches  see for instance: “London violates 
committment of  Sino-British Joint Declaration”, Global Times, 29 August 2019; 
and “Sino-British Declaration has no paragraph about ‘dual universal suffrage’”, 
Xinhuanet, 20 September 2019; J. Cushnahan “Hong Kong: UK must tell UN 
China reneging on obligations”, The Irish Times, 14 June 2019; and N. Smith, 
“Britain warns China to abide by one country-two systems rule ahead of  
anniversary protests”, The Telegraph, 30 June 2019.
22 See among others: J. Cheng, “The Tiananmen Incident and the Pro-Democracy 
Movement in Hong Kong”, China Perspectives, 2009/2, pp. 91-100; about the 
impact of  Beijing Spring 1989 on Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement, see among 
others: J. Lagervist and T. Ruhlig, “The Mobilization of  Memory and Tradition: 
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement and Beijing’s 1989 Tiananmen Movement”, 
Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations: An International Journal”, 
vol. 2, no. 2, August/September 2016, pp. 735-774.
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governance have a long history in Hong Kong that dates back 
to the colonial years. According to the volume co-edited by 
Michael H.K. Ng and John D. Wong (2017), while Hong 
Kong is traditionally considered one of the most stable cities 
in Asia, it has experienced several demonstrations and struggles 
against the colonial and post-colonial governments in the past 
century. Many of these movements emerged under the banner 
of justice and unfolded in the context of global unrest, showing 
the interplay between evolving notions of justice, governance, 
law and order and culture in the under-explored history of 
Hong Kong’s instability.23
Conclusion
In the introduction to the “Hong Kong History Project: 
Rethinking a City’s History”, Vaudine England writes that 
historiography has made it clear that Hong Kong is the product 
of far greater forces at work than merely the British victories 
in the “Opium Wars”. Placing Hong Kong’s development in 
a global context helps to understand the variety of actors who 
have made Hong Kong their home by considering Hong Kong 
not merely as a lonely, Chinese land but as a way-station on the 
routes of globalisation. From this comes the sense of studying 
Hong Kong as having not only a past of Chinese victimhood or 
British aggression, but as a cosmopolitan place. It also helps to 
explain why the post-colonial present is so very cosmopolitan, 
too. The majority of the population always was Chinese but 
never, since 1841, solely so. Even within the first generation of 
international settlers in Hong Kong, a new kind of indigenous 
was formed by the intimate mixing of Chinese and other 
ethnicities that eventually gave rise to multi-racial generations. 
Hong Kong’s unique development also produced multi-cultural 
people, and each one of them identifies only with Hong Kong 
23 M.H.K. Ng and J.D. Wong (eds.), Civil Unrest and Governance in Hong Kong. Law 
and Order from Historical and Cultural Perspectives, New York, Routledge, 2017.
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– not with China or the UK. These people are the product 
of Hong Kong’s cosmopolitan past, something without which, 
today’s Hong Kong could not be imagined.24 
24 V. England, “Globalizations, Cosmopolitanism and the Emergence of  Hong 
Kong. Or Learning Global History to Help Put Hong Kong in Context”, in 
Hong Kong History Project. 
2.  Political Contestation in Hong Kong: 
     From Containment to Elimination
 Alvin Y.H. Cheung
“The fact that you are allowed to stay alive, already shows the 
country’s inclusiveness”.1
The approach of the Beijing and Hong Kong governments 
to political contestation in Hong Kong – especially after the 
“Umbrella Movement” protests of 2014 – can best be described 
as a one-way ratchet. Prior to the Umbrella Movement, Beijing 
appears to have viewed pro-democracy politicians and activists 
in the territory as an irritant to be tolerated. However, in the 
aftermath of the Umbrella Movement, then-Chief Executive 
Leung Chun-ying took the lead in condemning political 
opposition within the territory, prompting Beijing to follow 
suit. The result has been a cycle of mutually reinforcing 
statements from both governments, and the growing 
radicalisation of opposition politicians and activists. As a result, 
both governments are no longer merely content to contain 
political opposition: their current strategy is to eliminate them 
from Hong Kong’s political landscape altogether.
1 Remarks attributed to Zhang Xiaoming, then Head of  the Central Government’s 
Liaison Office in Hong Kong, in August 2014: see J. Pomfret, China Asserts 
Paternal Rights over Hong Kong in Democracy Clash, Reuters, 10 September 2014.
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Pre-Umbrella Movement: Containment
Beijing’s initial strategy, as reflected in the Basic Law’s provisions 
on selecting legislators and the Chief Executive, was one of 
containment.2 The drafting of the Basic Law was largely driven 
by hard-line pro-Beijing members, particularly after 1989 – a fact 
reflected in the selection mechanisms for the Chief Executive and 
Legislative Council.3 Chief Executives are chosen by an “Election 
Committee”, the composition of which has been carefully selected 
to tilt the playing field in favour of Beijing’s ideal candidate.4 
Similarly, half of the seats in the Legislative Council are chosen 
by “functional constituencies”, giving disproportionate weight 
to business and professional interests. Although the Basic Law 
provides that the “ultimate aim” is to elect the Chief Executive 
and all legislators by “universal suffrage”,5 it also declared that no 
changes to electoral arrangements could take place until 2007, 
ten years after the transfer of sovereignty.6
Beijing’s strategy of containing political opposition in 
Hong Kong continued through the 2000s. In the wake of 
public demands for democratisation in late 2003, then-Chief 
Executive Tung Chee-hwa referred the issue of constitutional 
development to the “National People’s Congress Standing 
Committee” (NPCSC). The NPCSC duly ruled out full 
elections for the Chief Executive in 2007 and for the Legislative 
Council in 2008.7 In 2007, following fresh calls for Hong 
2 For a history of  these developments, see generally A.Y.H. Cheung, Road to 
Nowhere: Hong Kong’s Democratization and China’s Obligations Under Public International 
Law, 40 Brook, J. Int’l L. 465, 2015.
3 Yash Ghai, “Hong Kong’s New Constitutional Order: The Resumption of  
Chinese Sovereignty and the Basic Law 60-61”, 1999 second edition.
4 See, e.g., B. Scott et al., How China Holds Sway Over Who Leads Hong Kong, 
Bloomberg, 28 February 2017.
5 Basic Law of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region §§ 45, 68 (Hong 
Kong).
6 Ibid., pt. Annexes I and II.
7 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xianggang 
Tebie Xingzhengqu Xingzheng Zhangguan Puxuan Wenti He 2016 Nian Lifa 
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Kong’s democratisation, the NPCSC delayed full elections 
again – this time from 2012 to 2017 (for Chief Executive) and 
2018 (for the Legislative Council).8
By March 2013, it became clear that Beijing could delay no 
more. On 27 March, Benny Tai – a soft-spoken law professor at 
Hong Kong University – launched the “Occupy Central with 
Love and Peace” (OCLP) social movement out of frustration 
with the slow pace of democratic reforms. The OCLP’s stated 
aim was to secure full elections for the Chief Executive and 
Legislative Council consistent with international standards, 
and – if necessary – to engage in the mass occupation of the 
central business district as an act of civil disobedience. Six days 
earlier, on 21 March, twelve pro-democracy political parties 
founded the “Alliance for True Democracy” (ATD), which also 
called for universal and equal suffrage.
Beijing’s response was to offer Potemkin elections. Over the 
course of 2013 and 2014, officials from Mainland China and 
pro-Beijing politicians in Hong Kong repeatedly asserted that 
Beijing had an absolute right to prevent any politician it deemed 
undesirable from being nominated to run for Chief Executive.9 
This culminated in an NPCSC decision on 31 August 2014 
that gave no meaningful scope to competitive Chief Executive 
elections.
Under the 2014 Decision, the existing “Election Committee” 
would become a “Nominating Committee”, tasked with naming 
two or three candidates. However, each candidate would require 
the support of at least 600 nominators – a drastic increase from 
Hui Chansheng Banfa De Jueding (全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於香
港特別行政區行政長官普選問題和 2016 年立法會產生辦法的決定) 
[Decision of  the Standing Committee of  the National People’s Congress on 
Issues Relating to the Selection of  Chief  Executive of  the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the 
Legislative Council of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 
2016] (adopted by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 31 August 2014) 
[hereinafter 2014 Decision].
8 Ibid.
9 A.Y.H. Cheung (2015), pp. 490-94.
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existing arrangements, under which only 150 nominations 
are required. In previous Chief Executive elections, the pro-
democracy camp had generally mustered the 150 nominations 
required to field an also-ran candidate: under the 2014 Decision, 
even that possibility would vanish altogether. The implication 
was clear – Beijing would only allow the Hong Kong public to 
ratify a choice it had already made at the nominating stage. The 
gulf between the NPCSC’s proposal for stage-managed elections 
and the expectation of genuinely free and fair elections was 
irreconcilable. On 26 September, students protesting against 
the 2014 Decision scaled a fence to occupy the forecourt of 
Hong Kong Government Headquarters in Admiralty, located 
on the site of the former British Navy base HMS Tamar; police 
moved in with pepper spray and batons. This initial occupation 
forced the OCLP’s hand; on 28 September, Benny Tai declared 
that “Occupy Central” had begun – days earlier than originally 
scheduled. From that point onwards, it was clear that a younger 
generation of activists had taken up the pro-democracy mantle 
from their forebears.
Post-Umbrella Movement: Elimination
The Umbrella Movement was, first and foremost, a demand 
for democratic elections. Although some participants may have 
believed in more fundamental political changes, such as self-
determination or even secession, these ideas remained at the 
fringes of the protest movement.
Nonetheless, Beijing and Tamar were quick to tar all pro-
democracy activists and politicians with the same accusation 
– i.e., that they were advocating Hong Kong independence. 
In his January 2015 Policy Address, then-Chief Executive C.Y. 
Leung pointedly attacked the Hong Kong University Student 
Union for “putting forward fallacies” on self-determination10 – 
10 T. Cheung et al., “Gloves off  as CY Leung targets Hong Kong student ‘lies’”, 
South China Morning Post , 14 January 2015.
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a notion that Executive Council convenor Lam Woon-kwong 
falsely equated with advocating independence.11
Leung’s accusation set the tone for subsequent conduct by 
the Hong Kong and Beijing governments – and galvanised 
the heretofore marginal “localist” political movement.12 Later 
that year, nativist groups “Hong Kong Indigenous” (formed 
in January 2015) and “Civic Passion” organised protests 
against cross-border trading of baby formula13 by visitors from 
Mainland China.14 Despite concessions, the nativist movement 
continued to gather momentum throughout the year.
Worse was to follow. On February 2016, localist protesters, 
outraged at the Hong Kong government’s clearance of street 
food vendors in Mong Kok district, gathered in protest. The 
protests turned violent in the early hours of 8 February when 
demonstrators clashed with police; the events, later dubbed the 
“Fishball Revolution”, were – at the time – the “worst outbreak 
of rioting since the 1960s”.15 Even though the protests initially 
began as an attempt to protect local culture, Zhang Xiaoming 
– then Chief of the Central Government’s Liaison Office in 
Hong Kong – was quick to refer to participants as “radical 
separatists”.16
11 Self-determination may be exercised through, inter alia, integration into 
an existing State and therefore does not necessarily involve secession: see D. 
Thürer and T. Burri, “Self-Determination”, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of  Public 
International Law, December 2008.
12 On localism in Hong Kong, see, e.g., S. Veg, “Hong Kong’s Enduring Identity 
Crisis”, The Atlantic, 16 October 2013.
13The cross-border trade has been driven by a combination of  anxiety over the 
safety of  products available within Mainland China and relaxed entry policies for 
Shenzhen residents: E. Cheung, “Explainer: Sheung Shui shambles as parallel 
traders leave a trail of  waste”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 15 July 2015; E. 
Wong, “Chinese Search for Infant Formula Goes Global”, The New York Times, 
25 July 2013.  Parallel traders have been accused of  obstructing roads, creating 
goods shortages, and causing businesses catering to local needs to be replaced by 
shops serving cross-border traders: E. Cheung, supra.
14 S. Sataline, “Meet the Man Who Wants to Make Hong Kong a City-State”, 
Foreign Policy, 18 May 2015.
15 “Street Violence and Politics”, The Economist, 13 February 2016.
16 A. Wong, “China Labels Protesters ‘Radical Separatists,’ and They Agree”, The 
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This cycle of escalating governmental invective and activist 
radicalisation continued throughout the year. On 28 March 
2016, Andy Chan announced the formation of the Hong Kong 
National Party (HKNP), with the express aim of advocating 
Hong Kong independence. In response, Hong Kong and Beijing 
officials declared that the mere suggestion of independence 
violated the Basic Law, and that it “far exceeded the topic of 
freedom of speech”.17 Yet, when pressed, then-Secretary for 
Justice Rimsky Yuen was either unable or unwilling to identify 
any part of Hong Kong law that criminalised the peaceful 
advocacy of independence.18 Nor has any official explained, 
to date, why an act that is “inconsistent” with the Basic Law 
merits suppression for that reason alone, and in the absence of 
any violence or threat of violence – a contention that would, if 
taken to its logical conclusion, prohibit any advocacy for any 
changes to the Basic Law.
Tamar would continue to invoke “advocating independence” 
as a pretext to target political opposition. Prior to the 2016 
Legislative Council elections, the Electoral Affairs Commission 
demanded that would-be candidates sign a form declaring that 
Hong Kong was an inalienable part of China, on pain of being 
barred from standing for election – move plainly intended to 
disqualify “localist” politicians from standing for election.19 
Pro-democracy and localist parties nonetheless made significant 
gains in the legislative elections.
The Hong Kong government then tried a different tactic: it 
demanded that two elected politicians, both members of the 
Youngspiration political party,20 be disqualified from office 
New York Times, 20 February 2016.
17 C. Yuen, “China, Hong Kong officials condemn independence movement”, 
HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press,  1 April 2016.
18 Secretary for Justice on advocating “independence of  Hong Kong”, https://
www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201604/01/P201604010705.htm
19 K. Cheng, “Gov’t rules LegCo candidates need to sign new declaration stating 
Hong Kong is part of  China”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 15 July 2016.
20 Youngspiration is a localist political party with a right-wing nationalist platform: 
see C. Chan and R. Chui, “The New Localists”, Varsity, 2 November 2016.
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for having tampered with their oaths of office. The NPCSC 
duly delivered a politically expedient “interpretation” of the 
Basic Law while a Hong Kong court was seized of the matter, 
effectively dictating the result to the Hong Kong judiciary.21 
The “interpretation” required that legislators-elect take their 
oaths of office “sincerely and solemnly” – a particularly elastic 
phrase that enabled Tamar to disqualify whomever it pleased 
from office. On the strength of this “interpretation”, the Hong 
Kong government successfully expelled four more popularly 
elected legislators from office in 2017.22
Tamar’s strategy of excluding pro-democracy politicians 
from political life continued into 2018. Early that year the 
Registration and Electoral Office banned Agnes Chow, a 
student activist and member of the political party Demosisto, 
from running for a Legislative Council seat on the basis that 
she advocated “self-determination”, a term the returning officer 
falsely equated with “independence”.23 More significantly, it 
also banned Eddie Chu, an elected legislator, from running 
for village representative.24 The returning officer who issued 
the ban noted that Chu had argued that individuals had a 
right to advocate independence, and therefore concluded that 
Chu himself was an advocate of independence – a remarkable 
leap of logic that would force politicians into the business of 
suppressing political speech.
Nor was Tamar content with merely preventing politicians 
from standing for election. On 24 September 2018, the 
Government banned the Hong Kong National Party under 
section 8 of the Societies Ordinance – Colonial-era legislation 
21 I briefly discuss this saga in “The Express Rail Co-location Case: The Hong 
Kong Judiciary’s Retreat”, Lawfare, 10 January 2019.
22 B. Haas, “Hong Kong Pro-Democracy Legislators Disqualified from 
Parliament”, The Guardian, 14 July 2017.
23 T. Phillips, “Hong Kong Authorities Block Pro-Democracy Candidate from 
Byelection”, The Guardian, 27 January 2018.
24 T. Grundy, “Hong Kong bans pro-democracy lawmaker Eddie Chu from 
running in village election”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press,  2 December 2018.
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originally intended to target triad societies.25 Under section 8, 
a Societies Officer may recommend that a society be banned if 
he reasonably believes that a ban is necessary in the interests of 
national security. The Government upheld the ban in February 
2019,26 following an appeal by HKNP founder Andy Chan – 
who was forced to present his case in the absence of a lawyer.27
The reasoning behind the ban is particularly worrying. In 
her written recommendation to ban the HKNP, Assistant 
Commissioner of Police Rebecca Lam took the view that a 
society could be banned on “national security” grounds, even 
if that society did not use force or the threat of force.28 This 
reasoning flies in the face of Tamar’s – and Beijing’s – obligations 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and Joint Declaration.29
All of the post-2014 developments described above are 
explicitly political. However, Tamar has also been using 
administrative discretion in other areas as a means to hobble 
political opposition.
The politicisation of prosecutorial discretion is a notable 
example. In August 2016, a magistrate imposed non-custodial 
sentences on Umbrella Movement leaders Joshua Wong, Nathan 
Law, and Alex Chow for their participation in the 2014 protest 
movement. Wong and Law were sentenced to community service 
25 K. Cheng, “Explainer: How Hong Kong is seeking to ban a pro-independence 
party using existing national security laws”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 19 July 
2018. 
26 K. Cheng, “Hong Kong’s ban on pro-independence National Party upheld, as 
gov’t rejects appeal”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 21 February 2019.
27 K. Cheng, “Leader of  banned pro-independence party presents appeal to 
Hong Kong gov’t”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 14 January 2019.
28 Letter from Rebecca H.T. Lam to the Secretary for Security dated 28 May 
2018, para 31.
29 National security exceptions to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights cannot be invoked in the absence of  the use or threat of  force: 
see Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Commission of  Jurists, 1 July 
1984, pp. 29-32.
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orders, whereas Chow was given a three-week jail sentence 
with a one-year suspension. In 2017, after Wong and Law had 
fulfilled their community service orders and shortly before 
Chow’s one-year suspension would expire, the Department of 
Justice applied to the Court of Appeal for harsher sentences 
against the trio. Then-Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen, a 
political appointee with limited criminal law experience prior 
to his appointment, decided to pursue the appeal in defiance 
of advice given by senior career prosecutors.30 The Court of 
Appeal duly ordered the trio’s immediate imprisonment.31 
These new sentences were ultimately overturned by the Court 
of Final Appeal in 2018.32
The politicisation of prosecutorial discretion has intensified 
under current Secretary for Justice Teresa Cheng. During 2019, 
several Department of Justice prosecutors complained that 
political considerations were increasingly being factored into 
deciding whether to prosecute.33 These developments have 
fuelled public perception that the police enjoys effective impunity 
for acts of brutality perpetrated against demonstrators.34
Nor has Tamar’s crackdown been confined to prosecutions. 
Hong Kong has no specialist legislation governing political 
parties: as a result, most parties are set up as limited companies 
so that they can rent office space, hire staff, and open bank 
accounts. Applications to the Companies Registry to 
incorporate are typically approved within a matter of weeks. Yet, 
30 V. Wu and J. Pomfret, “Critics Cry Foul as Joshua Wong and Other Young 
Hong Kong Democracy Leaders Get Jail”, Reuters, 17 August  2017.
31 K. Cheung, “Hong Kong jails Joshua Wong and democracy activists over 2014 
Umbrella Movement protests”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 17 August 2017.
32 B. Haas, “Hong Kong Activists Have Jail Sentences Overturned”, The Guardian, 
6 February 2018.
33 群檢控人員」律政司信箋發公開信 狠批鄭若驊只懂向特首叩頭, 立
場新聞, Stand News, 31 July 2019, https://bit.ly/2WdyQud; “怒不可遏”律政
司刑事檢控科律師公開信 促政府明確撤回條例 明示內部有政治壓力, 
立場新聞, Stand News, 30 July 2019, https://bit.ly/2WdIopd
34 N. Liu and S.-L. Wong, “Hong Kong: ‘You Either Have the Rule of  Law or 
You Don’t’”, Financial Times, 19 November 2019.
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when the Hong Kong National Party applied in March 2016, 
its application was rejected, apparently for political reasons.35 
Joshua Wong’s political party Demosisto encountered similar 
difficulties. The party applied for incorporation in April 2016. 
However, the Companies Registry made no decision until 
2018, shortly before legislative by-elections. Not surprisingly, 
it rejected the application. By refusing to allow opposition 
political parties to register as companies, the Hong Kong 
government has significantly hampered their ability to operate 
or organise.
Even where an opposition political party is able to incorporate, 
it faces major obstacles in raising money. Pro-Beijing parties are 
able to rely on their patrons’ largesse. The Democratic Alliance 
for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), the largest of these 
parties, raised “tens of millions” at a single fundraising dinner 
in 2016.36 In contrast, pro-democracy parties raise significantly 
less from major donors than their pro-Beijing counterparts.37 
As a result, they are more reliant on small donors and the sale 
of merchandise at protests or Lunar New Year’s fairs. Banning 
large-scale public protests, or banning political parties from 
operating Lunar New Year stalls, will therefore have a much 
greater effect on opposition parties.
Tamar began to engage in the latter tactic in 2017. Previously, 
parties from across the political spectrum were free to operate 
stalls at Lunar New Year’s fairs. This was not to last. In January 
2017, days before a major Lunar New Year’s market was due 
to begin, the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department 
(FEHD) – one of the departments responsible for operating 
these markets – abruptly terminated stall contracts with HKNP 
35 H. Wong, “Newly formed pro-independence Hong Kong National Party 
‘denied registration’ by Companies Registry”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 29 
March 2016. 
36 E. Ng, “Pro-Beijing DAB party raises tens of  millions of  dollars at dinner 
attended by top officials”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 22 November 2016.
37 Ibid.
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and Youngspiration.38 The FEHD defended the exclusion on 
the spurious basis that both parties planned to sell merchandise 
that advocated Hong Kong’s independence, and that the 
number of visitors would endanger public order and public 
safety. Its decision also left both parties with no recourse, as 
the appeals process would continue until well after the market 
had closed. The FEHD went further in 2019, by imposing a 
blanket ban on political and satirical merchandise for 2020 – 
regardless of the political party it came from or the message 
it expressed – at Lunar New Year’s fairs, ostensibly for crowd 
control purposes.39 The practical – and likely intended – effect 
was to deprive pro-democracy politicians of a much-needed 
fundraising opportunity.
Conclusion
The vitriol and repression that Beijing and Tamar have directed 
at political opposition in Hong Kong look set to intensify. 
By late 2019, numerous Mainland officials and advisers were 
demanding that Hong Kong enacts its own national security 
legislation40 – legislation that will likely provide a pretext for 
banning yet more political parties. They have also declared that 
“national security” demands “improvements” to how the Chief 
Executive is selected41 – “improvements” that are unlikely to 
increase the odds that an opposition candidate can run at all.
This cycle of repression has had a remarkable effect on 
activism and protest in Hong Kong. A hallmark of the 2019 
38 D. Mok, “Youngspiration and HKNP Barred from Operating Stalls at Hong 
Kong’s Largest Lunar New Year Fair”, South China Morning Post, 19 January 2017.
39 “Satire, politics stripped from Lunar New Year fairs”, RTHK, 7 November 
2019.
40 L. Zhen, “Hong Kong ‘Must Not Delay National Security Law’”, South China 
Morning Post, 21 December 2019; “Need for national security law in Hong Kong 
‘becoming urgent’”, South China Morning Post, 10 November 2019.
41 “China Says Will ‘improve’ Way Hong Kong Leader is Selected to ‘Safeguard 
National Security’”, AFP, 1 November 2019.
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protests was the degree of solidarity between “wo lei fei” 
(people engaged in peaceful, non-violent protest) and “yung 
mo” (radical front-line protesters)42 – something that had been 
largely absent from Hong Kong politics in previous years. 
Had the Hong Kong and Beijing governments not tarred both 
groups alike with the secessionist accusation, such unity would 
have been unthinkable.
Despite these failures, Beijing’s policy looks set to continue. 
Luo Huining, the new head of Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong 
Kong, warned on 21 February 2020 that the opposition planned 
to “steal the power to govern” by winning more than half of 
the seats in the Legislative Council elections later in the year.43 
This is entirely consistent with Beijing’s practice since 2014. 
When asked on 19 August that year whether any democrat 
would be allowed to run for Chief Executive, Luo’s predecessor 
Zhang Xiaoming retorted with the statement reproduced as 
the epigraph to this chapter: “the fact that you are allowed 
to stay alive, already shows the country’s inclusiveness”.44 
Given Beijing’s continued refusal to acknowledge any political 
participation by democrats as legitimate, Beijing’s Hong Kong 
strategy under Luo – and new Hong Kong and Macau Affairs 
Office chief Xia Baolong – looks set to be one of “beatings will 
continue until morale improves”.
Stop press: On 18 April 2020 Hong Kong police arrested 
fifteen prominent pro-democracy figures, including Martin Lee 
(barrister and founder of the Democratic Party), Margaret Ng 
(barrister and former legislator), and Lee Cheuk-yan (union 
leader and labour rights activist), for joining three “unapproved” 
protests in 2019.
The arrests follow an announcement from the Central 
Government’s Hong Kong Liaison Office that it is not bound 
42 S. Mahtani, “Large, Peaceful Protest Shows Hong Kong’s pro-Democracy 
Movement is Still Strong”, Washington Post, 8 December 2019.
43 收「篤灰」報告 駱惠寧晤建制令「全力支持」林鄭, 蘋果日報, 22 
February 2020.
44 J. Pomfret (2014).
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by Article 22 of the Basic Law (prohibiting interference in 
matters within the scope of Hong Kong’s autonomy), as well 
as renewed calls by Chinese officials for Hong Kong to enact 
national security legislation.
3.  The Fatality of Dissent: 
     Comparing the 2014 and 2019 
     Hong Kong Protests
Eric Sautedé
Dubbed a “barren rock” by Lord Palmerston in 1841 only to 
become the last and arguably most precious jewel in the British 
imperial crown by the end of the XX century, and seen as an 
emblem of global capitalism for its prestigious stock exchange, 
massive deep-water seaport and the world’s busiest airport for 
cargo traffic, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(SAR) has recently acquired a distinct reputation as a hotbed of 
political protest at the vanguard of democratic struggle in Asia. 
Long gone are the days when Hong Kongers were described 
as politically “apathetic”1 and dedicated only to accumulating 
wealth, even if that meant working two or three jobs at a time 
and, more importantly, never complaining about harsh living 
conditions. Such, at one time, was supposed to be “the spirit 
of the Lion Rock”: blending hard work and solidarity with 
perseverance in order to climb the social ladder and claim the 
reward of wealth. This characterisation was originally derived 
from a radio drama series entitled Below the Lion Rock, broadcast 
in the 1970s, a time of rapid growth in cultural awareness in 
1 The idea of  political apathy had already been challenged by Prof. Lam Wai-man 
in the early 2000s when she published a detailed study of  13 thirteen local protests 
that had taken place between 1949 and 1979, see L. Wai-man, Understanding the 
Political Culture of  Hong Kong: The Paradox of  Activism and Depoliticization, New 
York, M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2004.
Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong’s “Infinity War”?44
the then British colony. Today, the lion-shaped rocky outcrop 
that dominates the Kowloon Peninsula has become a symbol 
of resistance against authoritarianism and resilience despite a 
highly uneven balance of power. 
In late October 2014, a small group of activists hung a 
giant 28-metre tall yellow banner adorned by an umbrella and 
bearing the words “I want real universal suffrage” (我要真普
选 wo yao zhen puxuan). In mid-October 2019, another small 
group of activists erected a four-meter tall statue of a female 
protester, named the “Lady Liberty of Hong Kong”, wearing 
protective gear and wielding an umbrella and flag carrying the 
slogan “Reclaim Hong Kong, revolution now” (光复香港，时
代革命 guangfu Xianggang, shidai geming). 
The 2014 “Umbrella Movement”, named after the mostly 
yellow umbrellas the protesters carried to protect themselves 
from the pepper spray and tear gas used by the riot police, took 
Hong Kong by storm over issues pertaining to universal suffrage. 
The protests translated into occupations of three key areas of 
the Special Administrative Region, including the financial 
district in the Central and Admiralty areas, for a period of 79 
days, with the number of protesters reaching 100,000 on a few 
occasions. Beginning in early June 2019, the not yet christened 
“Be Water Movement”, named after a famous motto of Hong 
Kong-born Bruce Lee promoting the virtues of fluidity and 
adaptability, was the result of widespread discontent over a 
new bill extending extradition procedures to Mainland China. 
This movement is still ongoing, although it reached its peak in 
August 18 when, according to its organisers, some 1.7 million 
people (i.e. one Hong Konger out of four) marched peacefully 
to once more reject the bill and voice their intense discontent 
towards the government. 
What do these two movements, sometimes referred to as 
“revolutions” (though aborted for now) have in common? 
What are the root causes of the discontent and what do they 
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imply for this “city in protest”?2 Is Hong Kong part of a wider 
phenomenon of popular rebellion? And what are the chances of 
these movements achieving positive outcomes for Hong Kong 
and China?
Triggering Factors
On the face of it, the triggering factors behind the two 
movements could not have been more different.
In 2014, what became the Umbrella Movement3 originally 
took the guise of a Hong Kong bred “Occupy” campaign, 
with an additional call for non-violence reflecting the 
Christian faith of two of its initiators. In March 2013, two 
university professors, Benny Tai Yiu-ting and Chan Kin-man, 
supported by the reverend Chu Yiu-ming, came up with a civil 
disobedience manifesto christened “Occupy Central with Love 
and Peace” (OCLP), the purpose of which was to advocate 
for true democratic process in Hong Kong according to 
international standards of universal suffrage. The “occupy” part 
was scheduled to start on 1 October 2014, China’s National 
Day, in protest against the Chinese government’s failure to take 
into account the wishes of Hong Kong’s people, as expressed in 
civic meetings. Popular support for democratic reforms peaked 
between 20 and 29 June, when close to 800,000 people, or 
slightly more than one fifth of registered voters, voted in a non-
binding referendum. All three options on the ballot paper called 
for the public to have the right to nominate candidates for the 
2017 Chief Executive election, and for the replacement of the 
system in which a happy few of only 1200, mostly unelected 
2 For a great short overview of  Hong Kong as a city of  civil disobedience, from 
the 1960s to the aftermath of  the Umbrella Movement, see A. Dapiran, City of  
Protest - A Recent History of  Dissent in Hong Kong, Penguin Books, Australia, 2017.
3 For a detailed and vivid account of  the 2014 movements, see J.Y. Ng, Umbrellas 
in Bloom: Hong Kong’s Occupy Movement Uncovered, Hong Kong, Blacksmith Books, 
2016; and R.C. Bush, Hong Kong in the Shadow of  China – Living with the Leviathan, 
Washington DC; Brookings Institution Press, 2016.
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and either pro-establishment and/or pro-Beijing, select rather 
than elect the highest authority of the Hong Kong SAR. The 
winning proposal was that tabled by the Alliance for True 
Democracy. It proposed that candidates should be nominated 
by gathering the support of 35,000 registered voters among 
the public, by obtaining the endorsement of a party which 
had secured at least five per cent of the vote in the previous 
legislative election, or by a nominating committee. 
The release on 10 June of a White Paper by China’s State 
Council on the practice of the “One country, two systems” 
formula, in which Beijing hammered home its “comprehensive 
jurisdiction” over Hong Kong and insisted that the “high 
degree of autonomy” conceded to the SAR translated 
neither into “full autonomy, nor decentralised power” gave 
Hong Kongers an added incentive to participate in the civic 
referendum. When, on 31 August, the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress released its decision stating 
that the 2017 Chief Executive would indeed be elected by 
universal suffrage but that a nominating committee, similar to 
the Election Committee, would be formed to pre-select two or 
three acceptable candidates, all the conditions needed for the 
Occupy Central movement to ignite came together. Then, on 
22 September, before the occupation scheduled for 1 October 
could take place, students began a strike against the central 
authorities’ decision. The Hong Kong Federation of Students 
together with Scholarism, a group of young people formed in 
2011 that had successfully repelled a government attempt to 
enforce more “patriotic education”, staged a protest outside the 
government headquarters on 26 September. This was the start 
of what is now known as the Umbrella Movement.
The streets protests that engulfed Hong Kong for most 
of the second half of 2019 kicked off very differently.4 In 
February, the government of the SAR announced its intention 
4 For a preliminary “full” account of  the 2019/2020 movements, see J. 
Wasserstrom, Vigil - Hong Kong on the Brink, New York, Columbia Global Reports, 
2020.
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to amend the laws on extradition and judicial cooperation in 
order to remove restrictive territorial clauses related not only 
to Greater China (PRC - the People’s Republic of China), 
but also to Taiwan (Republic of China) and Macao. The 
government presented the move as an attempt to remedy a 
loophole inherited from the 1997 handover. The measure was 
needed urgently, it was claimed, because, if extradition were 
not secured rapidly, a murder committed by a Hong Kong man 
in Taiwan in early 2018 would be left unpunished. Under the 
proposed amendments, anyone in Hong Kong subject to legal 
proceedings in the PRC, residents and foreigners alike, would 
become justiciable in the PRC itself. 
As early as March, legal professionals, led by the Hong 
Kong Bar Association and the more conservative Law Society, 
expressed substantive reservations, firstly regarding the 
government’s baffling eagerness to amend the law (an ad hoc 
extradition agreement with Taiwan was entirely possible), 
secondly and more importantly concerning the lack of 
formal guarantees, judicial or legislative, that the Hong Kong 
authorities could oppose any extradition request considered to 
be ungrounded. The bill implied that a new level of cooperation 
would be established between two judicial systems still widely 
seen as incompatible, notably with regard to human rights, and 
that the ultimate bulwark against any dubious request made by 
the PRC judicial system would rest with the Chief Executive, 
herself appointed by Beijing. A first demonstration on 31 
March gathered only a few thousand people but another on 
28 April brought together 130,000 protesters and, ultimately, 
mobilised the business community, a powerful force in Asia’s 
leading financial centre. This obliged the government to 
partially amend its original bill at the end of May, removing 
certain economic violations from the list of extraditable offenses 
and retaining only crimes punishable by more than seven years 
imprisonment. Yet, as noted by numerous democrats, that was 
“too little, too late”. 
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In the wake of the 30th anniversary commemoration of 
the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre on June 4, attended 
by 180,000 participants in Victoria Park, the Civil Human 
Rights Front, a collective of organisations responsible for the 
biggest protests in Hong Kong since 2002, orchestrated a 
massive demonstration calling for the total withdrawal of the 
bill. On 9 June, almost one million Hong Kongers took to the 
streets. The following Sunday, angered by the intransigence 
of the government and the mere “suspension” of the bill, a 
human tide of two million demonstrators – a quarter of the 
territory’s total population – marched from Victoria Park to 
the seat of government. The “Five demands, not one less” (五
大诉求 缺一不可 Wu da suqiu que yi buke) that would go 
on to inspire the movement were presented on this occasion: 
complete withdrawal of the extradition bill; retraction of the 
characterisation of “riot” to describe the 12 June protests (during 
which young protesters prevented the second reading of the bill 
in the Legislative Council); release and exoneration of arrested 
protesters; establishment of an independent commission of 
inquiry into police behaviour; and the resignation of the 
Chief Executive. After 1 July, this fifth request morphed into a 
demand for universal suffrage for Legislative Council and Chief 
Executive elections.
Deep-Rooted Causes: It’s the Politics, Stupid!
It is quite clear that both movements converge towards a 
common two-fold aim, despite the differences in their origins: 
the full and effective enjoyment of a “high degree of autonomy” 
as promised both by the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration 
(JD) and the 1990 Basic Law (BL) governing Hong Kong 
affairs until 2049 and, in the meantime, a commitment to 
establishing truly meaningful democratic institutions in Hong 
Kong, as specified in the said BL’s articles 45 (“The ultimate 
aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage 
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating 
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committee in accordance with democratic procedures”) and 68 
(“The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the 
Legislative Council by universal suffrage”). 
Both movements grew out of a triple frustration: towards 
Hong Kong’s leaders for not understanding society’s demands; 
towards the same leaders for not conveying the proper messages 
to Beijing; and towards the central authorities and their 
representatives in the SAR for being intransigent and tone-deaf 
to the people’s pleas. This multifaceted grievance resulted in a 
breach of trust in the SAR’s top leadership on the one hand and 
in the system in general on the other. 
In 2014, the then much-loathed Chief Executive, Leung 
Chun-ying, nicknamed “The Wolf” by democrats and often 
referred to simply as “689” (the number of votes out of 1200 
he received for his election) suffered a dive in popularity ratings 
during the actions of the Umbrella Movement despite the fact 
that the movement itself never won the support of the majority. 
By late October 2014, Mr Leung was at his lowest popularity 
(below 40% approval rating) since becoming Chief Executive 
in March 2012 (his highest being 56.5% on 12 May 2012). 
In 2019, nobody thought that Chief Executive Carrie Lam, 
nicknamed “777” for the number of votes she obtained in 2017 
and sometimes “CY 2.0” in reference to her predecessor, could 
fare worse than Mr Leung. She had actually started work with 
a comfortable 63.6% support in July 2017. In just two weeks’ 
time, however, from early June to mid-June 2019, her rating 
fell from 43.3% to 32.84%, the biggest drop ever recorded. She 
never recovered and reached a rock-bottom figure of 18.2% in 
mid-February 2020.5 The result today is the lowest satisfaction 
ever in the government’s performance (82.5% dissatisfaction) as 
well as the lowest overall trust ever recorded (75.9% distrust). 
The situation is even worse than during the SARS/anti-National 
Security Bill movement conundrum of 2003.
5 For the main polls conducted in Hong Kong, see https://www.hkupop.hku.
hk/ and since July 2019, https://www.pori.hk/opinion-charts.
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In 2014, as indeed in 2019, one of the main factors behind 
Hong Kongers’ distrust of their government was their sense of 
impotence, often exacerbated by the disproportionate nature 
of the government’s reactions. 87 tear gas canisters were fired 
against demonstrators (something not seen in Hong Kong 
since the Cultural Revolution riots of the 1960s) at dusk on 
28 September 2014, the very day Benny Tai announced the 
launch of the Occupy Central campaign. This in itself brought 
many people to rally in support of the few thousands student 
protesters. The almost three month long protest movement 
resulted in total misunderstanding between the parties. Their 
inability to reach out to one another came to a head during 
a 21 October live TV debate between representatives of the 
movement, led by student leader Alex Chow, and senior 
officials, led by Chief Secretary Carrie Lam, then number 2 in 
the government. Given the failure of this debate both in form 
and substance, it is ironic that Carrie Lam chose “We Connect” 
as her main campaign slogan for the 2017 Chief Executive 
election. 
Ultimately, less than 1,000 people were detained during the 
2014 protests and it was not until April 2019 that four out of 
nine Occupy leaders were sentenced to 16 months in prison, 
with Chan Kin-man being the only one to effectively serve his 
sentence. In 2019-20, the government’s response was almost 
entirely repressive and far more violent, resulting in demands 
for an independent commission of enquiry into police violence, 
even though the withdrawal of the law was formally announced 
on 4 September and became effective on 23 October. As of 
March 2020, police forces have admitted to firing more than 
16,000 rounds of tear gas, 10,000 rubber bullets, 2,000 beanbag 
rounds, and 19 live bullets, two of which hit and wounded 
protesters, including one on 1 October, China’s National Day. 
As of 1 March, 7,165 people have been arrested in relation to 
the events, including around 1,200 under 18 years of age.6
6 For a a protest prosecution database, see “Protest Prosecution Database”, Hong 
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In 2014, if we set aside the early days and a few clashes in 
Mong Kok, the only site on the Kowloon peninsula where 
violence occurred, the Umbrella Movement remained mostly 
peaceful. In 2019, the Legislative Council was stormed and 
trashed on 1 July. From mid-August to December, hardly a 
weekend went by without clashes between young, black-clad 
protesters and the police. Parades, occupations of public and 
semi-public spaces as well as flash mob rallies, often organised 
via the LIHKG online platform, Hong Kong’s own Reddit, 
and Telegram messaging services, spread throughout the entire 
SAR, from the Central business district to the distant New 
Territories. For a few months, the sight of young girls and boys, 
often university students, dressed in black, wearing gas masks 
bought online and generally armed with umbrellas, erecting 
makeshift barricades with street furniture and occasionally 
throwing Molotov cocktails to slow police advances, became 
common. On several occasions, clashes also involved mobsters: 
on 21 July, white-shirted triad-looking brutes attacked 
unarmed protesters with wooden sticks and steel rods at Yuen 
Long station, with the police evidently turning a blind eye. 
Ultimately, even the vandalising of the MTR, Hong Kong’s 
subway, by more radical protesters was political in essence as 
the company’s management had been frequently denounced for 
collaborating too dutifully with the government in imposing de 
facto curfews by suspending services at times of large gatherings.
Socio-economic factors have provided at best a fertile ground 
for disgruntlement, though Hong Kong is infamous for its high 
Gini index (0.539) (worse even than the United States), the 
most expensive real estate in the world (the average price of a 
flat stands at a record 21 times the median salary) and almost 
500,000 working poor despite one of the highest per capita 
GDPs (Gross Domestic Products) on the planet. Politics have 
always been the decisive factor. Past governments bear most of 
the responsibility for the land shortage that led to a lack of 
Kong Watch, 2 April 2020. 
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building plots and a dramatic drop in housing completion after 
2003-04, in the wake of the SARS crisis. For a decade starting in 
2006, housing construction, whether public or private, was more 
than halved compared to the previous ten years, driving prices 
artificially high.7 Major developers hold a lot of power in many 
sectors in Hong Kong, and make up or influence a significant 
portion of the 1200 people who elect the Chief Executive. 
While Carrie Lam first attributed the 2019 anti-extradition 
crisis to “communication” blunders, she later admitted on many 
occasions that socio-economic issues, especially pertaining to 
housing, income distribution, social justice and opportunities 
for youth were to blame for radicalising the young and for 
society’s growing defiance of the government. Interestingly 
enough, in mid-October, polls continued to indicate that more 
than 50% of the population attributed the spiral of violence to 
the incompetence of the government and almost 60% believed 
that more radical action was needed if the government failed to 
respond. The vast majority (over 80%) also confided than they 
were more dissatisfied with the political environment than they 
were disgruntled by the economic situation (under 40%).8
The intransigence displayed by the central authorities 
played a crucial role in creating the deadlock that led to the 
radicalisation of both movements. In 2014, Beijing’s white 
book and later the decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress restricting electoral system reforms 
symbolised the inflexibility of the central authorities. In 2019, 
threatening rhetoric from Beijing and from its liaison office 
in Hong Kong came to a climax in August when the defence 
ministry announced that the People’s Liberation Army could 
legally intervene to help Hong Kong “maintain social order” 
7 See “Insufficient Land Supply leading to Imbalance in Supply-Demand”, Task 
Force Land Supply, for more details.
8 See Anti-Extradition Bill Movement People’s Public Sentiment Report, PORI Hong 
Kong Public Opinion Research Institute; and People’s Level of  Concern about 
Political, Economic and Livelihood Problems, PORI, Hong Kong Public Opinion 
Research Institute.
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if requested to do so by the territory’s government. A few days 
later, a spokesman for China’s Hong Kong and Macao Affairs 
Office warned that the central government would not allow 
anything to threaten “One country, two systems”. August 
proved such a critical month that some analysts began to 
speculate that another Tiananmen Massacre might occur. 
Between 2014 and 2019, several key developments fuelled 
the suspicion that Beijing was encroaching more and more on 
Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy”. In 2015, five members 
of staff from Causeway Bay Books, a bookstore well-known for 
selling and publishing books in Chinese critical of the PRC, 
disappeared under dubious circumstances only to reappear on 
the mainland, with some making confessions on Chinese TV. 
In 2016, Beijing played a crucial role in the disqualification 
of two newly-elected young democrats for taking their oath 
improperly, i.e. by wearing a blue banner reading “Hong Kong 
is not China” (an additional four were later disqualified for 
similar reasons). In 2017, Chinese billionaire Xiao Jianhua 
was abducted from the Four Seasons Hotel in Hong Kong by 
Chinese public security agents and taken to Mainland China.
In early September 2019, a private conversation between 
Carrie Lam and business leaders was leaked to the public. In 
that recording, Mrs Lam at one point confessed that she had 
“to serve two masters by constitution, that is the central people’s 
government and the people of Hong Kong” and that her 
“political room for manoeuvring [was] very, very, very limited”. 
For Hong Kongers, obviously, one master seems to be better 
served than the other. 
Conclusion: Failure or Success, and for Whom?
Between 2014 and 2019, protests and the reactions provoked 
by them grew in strength and intensity, affecting all three unities 
of time, place, and action, as in a classical drama.
The unrest of 2014 already seemed protracted (at almost 
three months). The protests that began in 2019 have continued 
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for over ten months, though the current coronavirus pandemic 
is inevitably having a calming effect. Withdrawal of the bill 
– the original demand – has been secured and yet trust in 
government continues to plummet and young demonstrators 
still mobilise over contentious issues like abusive arrests, police 
misbehaviour, mishandling of the sanitary crisis, etc. 
The actions that, in 2014, remained circumscribed within 
three partially occupied Hong Kong districts today impact 
the entire territory, giving even more impetus to popular 
sovereignty. All kinds of gathering spaces have been engulfed: 
the occupation of a semi-public mall like New Town Plaza in 
Sha Tin on 14 July was an unprecedented act for this part of the 
New Territories, where no political movement had been seen 
since the 1960s. The famous Lennon Wall of 2014, an outdoor 
staircase plastered with multi-coloured post-its bearing the 
hopes and desires of demonstrators, became several hundred 
such Lennon Walls in June, with corridors and flyovers leading 
to MTR stations transformed into open-air galleries adorned 
not only with post-its but all sorts of posters rivalling each other 
in creativity.9 
Finally, while the plot has remained the same – political in 
essence and mixing identity issues with democratic demands 
– it has thickened. Demonstrators have become younger and 
more restless, and peaceful demands have turned into violent 
outbursts as the government’s response has turned to mutism. 
Occupations of university grounds, like those at Chinese 
University (CUHK) or Polytechnic University, destruction 
of public and even private property whose owners were 
considered too supportive of the government would have been 
unimaginable in 2014. Also inconceivable in 2014 was the idea 
that a movement led by radicalised young people could benefit 
from the continuous support of a majority of the population. 
In mid-October, a survey by CUHK showed that 73% of those 
9 J. Creery, “Wilting bauhinias and widemouthed tigers: The evolution of  Hong 
Kong’s protest posters”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 25 July 2019. 
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asked supported the resignation of the Chief Executive and 
that 81% considered the push for universal suffrage necessary. 
Surprisingly, some 45% also declared that they would condone 
any form of escalation if the government failed to heed the 
movement’s demands. Only 24% condemned the vandalism of 
MTR stations and, amazingly, only 1.6% reproved attacking 
the police!
Whereas the government’s strategy of attrition eventually 
wore down the protest movement of 2014, the same cannot be 
said of 2019-20. The “Be Water Movement” is still going strong 
and is constantly changing its modes of expression. With its all-
out repressive riposte, the SAR has only managed to tarnish the 
reputation of the Hong Kong police, once considered “Asia’s 
finest”. While only 6.5% of those surveyed in late May 2019 
reported a total distrust of the police (0 on a scale of 10), this 
figure had rocketed to 51.5% by mid-October!
Contrary to common belief, the 2014 movement was not a 
total failure, though a truly democratic reform package for the 
electoral system is still a long way off: the protests encouraged a 
new generation of politicians to emerge. Quite a large number of 
these proved successful in the 2016 legislative elections, though 
the oath-taking controversy stopped some from sitting in the 
Legislative Council. The then Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, was 
also prevented from running for a second term in 2017.
In late November 2019, the wide support enjoyed by the 
Be Water Movement translated into a landslide victory for 
the democrats, with many young candidates and new-comers 
entering politics in the district council elections, capturing 
close to 400 seats out of 452 and taking control of 17 local 
councils out of 18. 
In early January 2020, the central authorities replaced the 
head of their liaison office in Hong Kong and in early February 
the Director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office in 
Beijing. Both new appointees are considered very close to China’s 
paramount leader Xi Jinping. It remains to be seen whether 
these changes will herald a new strategy that will take stock of 
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democratic demands or, on the contrary, further antagonise a 
deeply divided and yet distinct community of Hong Kongers. 
For now, though, the global emergency of the Covid-19 
pandemic that originated in Wuhan has somewhat subdued 
the attention of the citizens, whose resilience, discipline and 
memory of the SARS crisis of 2002 have helped overcome the 
first two waves of the outbreak (as of April 22, there have been 
only 1,030 cases and 4 fatalities because of the virus in Hong 
Kong). Even though the government in Beijing has for now 
managed to shed a positive light over its handling of the crisis, 
one must remember that it is precisely the combination of a 
direct threat to public liberties – the attempt at forcing through 
the passing of a new state security law – with the initial and 
shameful cover up of the first coronavirus outbreak that led to 
the massive anti-governmental demonstrations of 1 July 2003, 
and eventually the resignation of the Chief Executive two years 
later.
4.  “Today’s Macau, Tomorrow’s 
     Hong Kong”? What Future for 
     “One Country, Two Systems”?
 Victoria Tin-bor Hui
“One Country, Two Systems”
China’s “one country, two systems” constitutional principle 
has been moving ever closer to “one country, one system”. 
The design, originally intended to entice Taiwan’s unification, 
has been practiced first in the Hong Kong and Macau Special 
Administrative Regions (SARs) since 1997 and 1999, respectively. 
The arrangement promises rule by locals under “a high degree of 
autonomy”, but Beijing has increasingly eroded local autonomy 
and asserted direct rule. Chinese leaders have hailed Macau as 
the paragon of “one country, two systems”, which, in practice, 
has meant rule by pro-Beijing loyalists. Hongkongers, fearful of 
the prospect of “today’s Macau, tomorrow’s Hong Kong”, have 
staged escalating waves of protest. Taiwanese, with the benefit 
of watching at a safe distance, overwhelmingly voted against 
“one country, two systems” under the campaign slogan “today’s 
Hong Kong, tomorrow’s Taiwan” in the January 2020 elections.
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The “One Country, Two Systems” Model: 
Promises and Contradictions
Hong Kong, more than Macau and Taiwan, is at the heart of the 
“one country, two systems” constitutional design. The original 
principle intended for Taiwan was an abstract idea until it was 
articulated in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD) and 
the 1990 Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. Macau’s handover arrangement was modelled after 
Hong Kong’s.
The JD promises Hong Kong “a high degree of autonomy” 
with separate customs, freedom of speech, the rule of law, 
final jurisdiction and other rights and freedoms. The Basic 
Law, Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, was supposed to codify 
the guarantees. Yet, by the time it was promulgated, the 
Tiananmen movement of 1989 had fully exposed the structural 
contradiction of “one country, two systems”. While Beijing 
viewed “two systems” primarily in terms of the socialist system 
in Mainland China versus the capitalist system in Hong Kong, 
Hongkongers focused on one-party dictatorship in Mainland 
China versus freedoms in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, the fear 
of “today’s Tiananmen, tomorrow’s Hong Kong” had driven 
many Hongkongers to provide moral and material support 
for demonstrations across China. In Beijing, Chinese leaders 
developed an obsession to make Hong Kong safe for the 
Communist Party.
Recently declassified documents show that London 
complained about the discrepancies between the two 
documents.1 Most importantly, the JD promises “a high degree of 
autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs”.2 This qualifier 
1 “UK knew early about holes with political reforms and interpretation in the 
Basic Law, Raised amendments with Beijing but rejected”, Apple Daily, 5 January 
2020.
2 Joint Declaration of  the Government of  the United Kingdom of  Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of  the People’s Republic of  China 
on the Question of  Hong Kong https://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/jd2.htm.
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is omitted in Article 2 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that 
“the National People’s Congress [NPC] authorizes the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree 
of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Law”.3 Moreover, while 
this clause mentions final jurisdiction, Article 158 gives the 
NPC Standing Committee final interpretation power over 
the Basic Law – a power that it has used five times since the 
handover. In recent years, Chinese officials have even reiterated 
that the JD, though it was filed with the United Nations and 
counts as a treaty, “is now void and only covered the period 
from the signing in 1984 until the handover in 1997”.4
The Basic Law exceeds the JD in providing for the “ultimate 
aim” of “universal suffrage” in the selection of the Chief 
Executive and the Legislative Council. Yet, rather than direct 
elections, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive would be selected 
by a 900-member Election Committee (later expanded to 
1200 members) dominated by pro-regime representatives. 
The Legislative Council is structured to keep pro-democracy 
votes in the perpetual minority by balancing members elected 
from geographical constituencies with pro-regime members 
from functional constituencies. The Chief Executive is ensured 
enough votes to push through any bills. 
The fundamental contradiction inherent to “one country, 
two systems” reflects what Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow 
call a “territorially-divided hybrid regime”.5 This “structural 
disjunction” between “the largely authoritarian Communist 
Chinese state and its quasi-democratic enclave” has built in 
3 The Basic Law of  the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of  the People’s 
Republic of  China https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/text/en/basiclawtext/.
4 D. Lee and G. Cheung, “Beijing tells Britain it has no ‘moral responsibility’ for 
Hong Kong Remarks come after ambassador told UK lawmakers JD is ‘void’”, 
South China Morning Post, 3 December 2014.
5 C. Tilly and S. Tarrow, Contentious Politics, Second Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, p. 89. 
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“an unstable mix of conventional, confrontational, and violent 
behaviour” with “unpredictable outcomes”.6 
Macau: The “Shining Chapter” of “One Country, 
Two Systems”
On 20 December 2019, President Xi Jinping presided over 
celebrations marking the twentieth anniversary of Macau’s 
return. He championed Macau as the “shining chapter” in 
the practice of “one country, two systems” for accepting 
“one country” as the prerequisite and basis of “two systems”, 
integrating the central government’s “comprehensive 
jurisdiction” over the city, passing national security and 
national anthem laws, forming a National Security Committee 
chaired by the Chief Executive, respecting the Chief Executive’s 
paramount authority over executive, legislative and judicial 
branches of government, promoting patriotic education and 
adopting Mainland textbooks in schools, and rejecting all forms 
of foreign interference. 7 
In the eyes of critics, however, Macau exemplifies how the 
constitutional principle of “one country, two systems” has been 
made subservient to one-party dictatorship. As Ka-Hou Sou, a 
pro-democracy legislator, remarked: “After 20 years in Macau, 
it is difficult to find the clear lines between the two systems”.8 
According to Sut-leng Kam, who has led the pro-democracy 
New Macau Association since 2017, “Macau is an example of 
the white terror that comes under ‘one country, two systems’”.9 
Sou has been arrested and found guilty for illegal assemblies. 
6 Ibid., pp. 75, 89, 91. 93.
7 “Xinhua Headlines: Xi lauds Macao’s ‘shining chapter’ of  ‘one country, two 
systems’ practice”, Xinhua, 21 December 2019.
8 S. Lee, “Myers In Macau, China Sees a Model for a Rebellious Hong Kong”, 
New York Times, 18 December 2019.
9 H. Chan, “China leader Xi Jinping praises Macau for promoting patriotism 
and ‘choosing unity over infighting’”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 20 December 
2019.
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The police have banned protests and the Court of Final Appeal 
has upheld the ban in the interest of social stability. Kam was 
followed and harassed during Xi’s visit. Accredited journalists10 
along with the chairman and president of the American 
Chamber of Commerce from Hong Kong were denied entry.11 
Over the years, professionals who expressed dissenting voices 
were fired and banished from all job prospects.12
Chinese leaders do not understand why what has worked 
in Macau would be met with fierce resistance in Hong Kong. 
As Jerome Cohen explains, the two cities have very different 
colonial legacies. While Macau has followed Portugal’s civil law 
tradition closer to China’s Leninist legal system, Hong Kong 
has inherited the UK’s common law tradition with “its belief in 
and practices for subjecting government to the rule of law”.13 
Moreover, Macau had become a “half-liberated zone” since 1966, 
when pro-Beijing forces inspired by the Cultural Revolution 
began to dominate the society.14 Before the handover, Portugal 
granted citizenship to anyone born in Macau before 1982 and 
their families. This exit option allowed those critical of Beijing 
to leave for any European Union country. In Hong Kong, the 
absence of exit means that doubters of Beijing have had to stay 
to fight. Furthermore, Portugal was amenable to China sending 
at least a dozen Mainland legal experts to study Portuguese law 
and then embedding them in the police and judicial branches. 
These mainlanders-turned-local officials – who include the 
10 Accredited reporters came from the Apple Daily, NowTV, Commercial 
Radio, Radio Television Hong Kong, South China Morning Post and Television 
Broadcast Co.
11 A.M. Roantree, “Hong Kong AmCham chairman and president denied entry 
to Macau”, Reuters, 7 December 2019.
12 J. Menezes, “Why Macau matters to Hong Kong: how ‘one country two 
systems’ turns into one-party rule”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 23 January 2020.
13 J.A. Cohen, “Macau and Hong Kong are too different for Beijing to treat them 
like peas in a pod”, South China Morning Post, 21 December 2019.
14 “Macau Basic Law does not contain the promise of  universal suffrage; CCP’s 
praise of  Macau and denigration of  HK ignore the two places’ differences”, 
Radio Free Asia, 18 December 2019.
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current security minister Sio-chak Wong, prosecutor general 
Son-sang Ip, five prosecutors and three judges – have created a 
compliant government in post-handover Macau.15 
“Today’s Macau, Tomorrow’s Hong Kong”?
Beijing has explicitly pointed to Macau as the role model for 
Hong Kong, which has rebelled against the passage of national 
security and national anthem laws, the introduction of national 
education, and the executive’s exertion of control over legislative 
and judicial branches.16 
The Anti-National Security Protest of 2003
Beijing wanted Hong Kong to pass a national security 
law in 2002. While Article 23 of the Basic Law requires its 
enactment, the legal profession took the lead in contesting that 
the proposed bill did not provide for sufficient safeguards as 
required by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).17 The bill would probably have been passed 
but for the fact that the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) alerted Hongkongers that Beijing had an expansive 
understanding of state secrets that included the emergence and 
spread of a deadly virus. Once SARS subsided in the summer of 
2003, half a million protested at the anniversary of the handover 
on 1 July.18 The bill was shelved and has not been re-tabled.
15 P. Siu, “Beijing sent team of  mainlanders to study law in Portugal, placed them 
in top Macau jobs after return to China 17 Dec, 2019, South China Morning 
Post”, South China Morning Post, 17 December 2019.
16 “HK must grasp ‘the spirit of  Beijing’: Li Zhanshu”, Radio Television Hong Kong, 
3 December 2019; S.L. Myers, “In Macau, China Sees a Model for a Rebellious 
Hong Kong”, New York Times, 18 December 2019.
17 SCMP Reporter, “The Article 23 argument”, South China Morning Post, 1 July 
2003.
18 K. Bradsher, “Security Laws Target of  Huge Hong Kong Protest”, New York 
Times, 2 July 2003. 
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While Hongkongers championed the victory, Beijing did 
not take this setback lightly. According to William Overholt, 
when Chinese leaders “saw demonstrations in Hong Kong, they 
feared another Tiananmen Square”; when they “heard demands 
for democracy, they feared a Taiwan-style independence 
movement”. 19 Chinese leaders could have avoided the 
unfounded fears if they could become “knowledgeable and 
comfortable with Hong Kong”. 20 Instead, Beijing opted to 
tighten control, kick-starting a “qualitative erosion” of “one 
country, two systems”.21
In addition to the long-standing Hong Kong and 
Macao Affairs Office (HKMAO), Beijing formed a Central 
Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs 
to oversee the SARs from the capital. It also created a 
structure of “two administrations” in Hong Kong.22 The 
“first administration” is headed by the Chief Executive, who is 
technically selected by the 1200-member election committee 
but is in fact handpicked by Beijing. S/he exercises the power 
of appointments and promotions to fill the Department of 
Justice, the police, and the civil service with loyalists. The 
Chief Executive can control even non-governmental sectors 
through funding and licensing. The “second administration” 
is Beijing’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong established in 2000. 
The former Director Wang Zhimin famously commented that, 
“it is good that Central (the Hong Kong government) and 
19 W.H. Overholt, Hong Kong: The Rise and Fall of  ‘One Country, Two Systems’, The 
Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard Kennedy 
School, December 2019, p. 11.
20 Ibid, p. 12.
21 Chi-kin Lo, “Reshuffling HKMAO: Strengthening Centralization and 
Heightening Danger”, Hong Kong Citizen News, 16 February 2020, https://www.
hkcnews.com/article/26956/港澳辦-夏寶龍-駱惠寧-26956/整頓港澳辦：
加強集權、更加危險.
22 Russell Hsiao’s interview, Hong Kong, 11 July 2019, R. Hsiao, “A Preliminary 
Survey of  CCP Influence Efforts in Hong Kong”, China Brief, Jamewstown 
Founation, vol. 19, no. 14, 31 July, 2019. 
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Western Districts (the Liaison Office) work together”.23 The 
“Western District” has since intervened not only at the top 
levels of the Hong Kong government but also reaches deep into 
all 18 administrative districts. District representatives mobilize 
human and material support for pro-Beijing candidates in 
various elections. These arrangements have effectively turned 
the promise of “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” into 
“Beijing appointees ruling Hong Kong” and “Western District 
ruling Hong Kong”. 
The Umbrella Movement of 2014
In 2012, Beijing had Hong Kong introduce national education 
to make young people “love the motherland”.24 The then-15-
year-old Joshua Wong and other secondary school students 
mobilised 100,000 demonstrators to successfully stop the 
policy.25 By 2014, these youthful faces would become seasoned 
activists in the Umbrella Movement.
The Basic Law stipulates “gradual and orderly progress” in the 
selection of the Hong Kong Chief Executive up to 2007 and the 
election of the Legislative Council up to 2008, with the “ultimate 
aim” of “universal suffrage”. This language gave Hongkongers 
the expectation that universal franchise would begin a decade 
after 1997. That did not happen – in 2007, Beijing issued a 
decision to postpone any changes for 10 years. By 2013, Benny 
Tai, a Hong Kong University Law School professor, began to 
agitate for universal suffrage beginning in 2017. However, in 
August 2014, Beijing issued yet another decision to proclaim 
the central government’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over the 
city.26 The decision also restricted “one person, one vote” in the 
23 “Wang Zhimin’s ‘Central and Western Districts Coming Together’ once stirred 
up controversy”, Sing Tao Daily (USA), 4 January 2020.
24 T. Cheung, “A history of  how national education was introduced in Hong 
Kong”, South China Morning Post, 9 September 2012. 
25 A. Lai, “‘National education’ raises furor in Hong Kong”, CNN, 30 July 2012.
26 T. Cheung, G. Cheung, S. Chan and K.-C. Ng, “Beijing emphasises its total 
control over Hong Kong in white paper”, South China Morning Post, 10 June 2014.
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election of the Chief Executive by allowing only two or three 
vetted candidates. Massive protests broke out in late August 
2014 and lasted to early December. Protesters occupied busy 
roads to decry “fake universal franchise” and demand “genuine 
universal suffrage”.27 A Chinese University study estimates 
that  1.2 million people out of a population of 7.2 million 
participated at various times and in various forms.28 Despite its 
unprecedented scale, the movement did not achieve its goal and 
only temporarily blocked Beijing’s plan for vetted elections.
To prevent Umbrella Movement 2.0, Chen Zuoer, former 
deputy Director of HKMAO, vowed in December 2014 to 
tighten “Hong Kong’s governance”. He declared “a long-
term struggle with the forces that bring calamity to Hong 
Kong”, taking the fight “from the street to the law courts, 
to the Legislative Council, to inside the government, and to 
universities and secondary schools”.29
Controlling the Hong Kong government and the legislature 
had long been Beijing’s policy, as mentioned above. This time, 
Beijing would take a step further. Ahead of the Legislative Council 
elections in 2016, the authorities barred an independence 
advocate, Edward Leung, from running. Two independence-
leaning candidates, Wai-ching Yau and Chung-hang Leung, 
were elected and displayed a “Hong Kong is not China” flag 
during their swearing-in ceremony in October 2016. The then-
Chief Executive Chun-ying Leung asked the court to disqualify 
them. But before the court issued a verdict, Beijing issued 
a binding interpretation of the Basic Law in November that was 
then used to retroactively disqualify any legislator-elect who 
27 M.C. Davis, “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement: Beijing’s Broken Promises”, 
Journal of  Democracy, April 2015, pp. 101-10; V. Tin-bor Hui, “Hong Kong’s 
Umbrella Movement: The Protest and Beyond”, Journal of  Democracy, April 2015, 
pp. 111-21.
28 Center for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, “Public Opinion & 
Political Development in Hong Kong Survey Results”, Press Release, Chinese 
University of  Hong Kong, 18 December 2014.
29 T. Cheung and F.W.Y. Fung, “Now Hong Kong must face the big questions in 
wake of  Occupy”, South China Morning Post, 13 December 2014.
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made revisions or additions to the formal oath.30 Faced with 
a strident and binding Beijing interpretation, the court fully 
complied and expelled the duo from the Legislative Council. 
The Department of Justice sought to disqualify four more 
legislators who never supported independence but played with 
the language in their oath of office: Democracy Groundwork’s 
Siu-lai Lau, Demosisto’s Nathan Law, the League of Social 
Democrats’ Kwok-hung Leung and architectural sector 
lawmaker Edward Yiu. Beijing’s interpretation was a direct 
interference with the judiciary’s independence.31 As a UK-based 
think tank Hong Kong Watch32 put it,
In this instance, [Beijing] has effectively issued an amendment 
to Hong Kong’s constitution to ensure that candidates are 
successfully politically screened. Although the CCP do 
technically have the right to ‘interpret’ the constitution, they 
do not, under Hong Kong’s Basic Law, have the right to amend 
local laws. In order to disqualify candidates, they have effectively 
amended local laws: and therefore, committed a violation of … 
the “high degree of autonomy” guaranteed for Hong Kong in 
the constitution.33 
In the aftermath of the Umbrella Movement, pro-Beijing 
voices repeatedly complained that judges released the majority 
of protest-related defendants or gave very lenient community 
service to the convicted few, while jailing police officers 
convicted of abuse. Chen Zuoer remarked in a closed meeting 
in November 2016 that Occupy leaders were not being dealt 
with harshly enough in local courts.34 The Department of 
30 K. Cheung, “China’s power to interpret Hong Kong’s Basic Law ‘greatest threat 
to rule of  law,’ Bar Assoc. Head”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 6 March 2018.
31 E. Tong, “Interview – Beijing’s restraint with Hong Kong’s rule of  law has 
expired, says law prof. Johannes Chan”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 25 June 
2017.
32 See Hong Kong Watch web site https://www.hongkongwatch.org/about-hkw.
33 Hong Kong Watch, “Why Hong Kong matters Understanding the importance 
of  the city to China and the world”, 26 February, 2020, p. 29
34 C. Leung, “‘No mercy’ for Hong Kong’s pro-independence ‘rats’ says head of  
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Justice appealed against the light community service given to 
young activists. By August 2017, the Court of Appeal handed 
down jail terms of six to eight months for student leaders Joshua 
Wong, Nathan Law (also one of the disqualified legislators) and 
Alex Chow, who were instrumental in sparking the Umbrella 
Movement.35 By April 2019, Benny Tai and eight more Occupy 
leaders were also handed down prison sentences of up to 16 
months for conspiracy to cause public nuisance, inciting others 
to cause public nuisance, and inciting people to incite others to 
cause public nuisance.36
Universities had become hotbeds of dissent. The Chief 
Executive stacked  university councils with pro-regime 
appointees, who would then duly appoint the “right” candidates 
to top positions.37 In secondary schools, patriotic education was 
re-introduced in piecemeal fashion.38
Other developments were no less blatant in eroding Hong 
Kong’s system. 
In January 2016, Lee Bo, a bookseller at Causeway Bay 
Books, was kidnapped from Hong Kong and taken across the 
border. Joshua Wong lamented that “we used to believe that 
we should be able to keep our physical safety even when we 
lose all other freedoms. However, the Lee Bo case shows that 
even our physical safety is at risk”.39 Even more scandalous was 
the abduction of Xiao Jianhua, a businessman with close ties 
top Beijing think tank”, South China Morning Post, 30 November 2016.
35 J. Siu, “Joshua Wong and other jailed Hong Kong student leaders see political 
careers halted”, South China Morning Post, 17 August 2017.
36 G. Shih, “Hong Kong court imprisons ‘Umbrella Movement’ leaders for up to 
16 months”, Washington Post, 24 April 2019.
37 J. Ng  and G. Chan, “University of  Hong Kong’s council votes 12-8 to reject 
Johannes Chan’s appointment as pro-vice-chancellor”,  South China Morning Post, 
29 September 2015.
38 K. Cheng, “National education scheme was never suspended in Hong Kong 
schools, says incoming education chief ”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 22 June 
2017.
39 Author’s note of  Joshua Wong speaking at “A Dialogue on the Future of  Hong 
Kong’s Democracy”, Hong Kong University, 12 January 2015.
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to China’s political elite, from the Four Seasons Hotel on 27 
January 2017.
In September 2018, the Hong Kong government ceded to 
Mainland jurisdiction parts of the West Kowloon high-speed 
railway terminal.40 Hong Kong residents have since been 
arrested in the Mainland area of the station and taken across 
the border.
Also in September 2018, the Hong Kong government banned 
the pro-independence Hong Kong National Party.41 Months 
later, Chief Executive Carrie Lam submitted a report to Beijing 
when Chinese officials requested details.42 Many in Hong Kong 
criticised this move as contradicting the Basic Law promise that 
Hong Kong would run its own internal affairs. The Hong Kong 
government also refused to renew the visa of Financial Times 
reporter Victor Millet, who had hosted a talk by the party’s 
founder Andy Chan at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club.43
Xi Jinping has defended the disqualification of legislators, the 
banning of the Hong Kong National Party and the expulsion 
of Victor Millet because such individuals and groups “damaged 
national security, challenged the central government’s and the 
Basic Law’s authority, took actions to infiltrate the Mainland”, 
– in short, “crossed the bottom line of ‘one country, two 
systems’”.44
40 J. Pomfret, “Unscheduled departure: China’s legal reach extends to Hong Kong 
rail station”, Reuters, 4 September 2018.
41 K. Cheng, “Pro-independence party officially banned by Hong Kong gov’t in 
historic move restricting freedom of  assembly”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 24 
September 2018.
42 H. Chan, “In full: Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam submits report to Beijing 
on banning pro-independence party, makes doc public”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free 
Press, 18 April 2019.
43 J. Lam , T. Cheung  and S. Lok-kei, “Backlash as Hong Kong denies visa 
renewal for Financial Times journalist Victor Mallet”, South China Morning Post, 
5 October 2018.
44 “Insisting and perfecting ‘One country, two systems”, Takung Pao, 9 November 
2019.
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To many Hongkongers, however, Beijing was turning “one 
country, two systems” into “one country, 1.5 systems”, even 
closer and closer to Macau’s “one system”.45 As Tsang Yok-sing, 
a long-standing pro-Beijing politician, put it in 2015:
If the central government’s interference goes deeper and deeper 
into Hong Kong’s internal affairs, at some point quantitative 
changes will become qualitative changes. Even if Beijing does 
not abrogate ‘one country, two systems’ by name, the central 
government will exert de facto direct rule over Hong Kong.46
The Anti-Extradition Protests since 2019
By early 2019, it looked as if the “two administrations” had 
firmly put Hong Kong on a tight leash. In February, the Hong 
Kong government proposed to amend the Fugitive Offenders 
Ordinance and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Ordinance to allow extradition from Hong Kong to 
Mainland China. Carrie Lam claimed that the bill came from 
her own volition and not from Beijing. But Reuters reports that 
the order came from the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, which was seeking a less politically damaging 
mechanism than extrajudicial kidnappings.47 The extradition 
bill would have torn down the last firewall that separated a still 
relatively professional judiciary in Hong Kong from politicised 
courts subservient to the ruling party across the border.
When Occupy leaders called for a mass demonstration 
against the extradition law, 130,000 turned out on 28 April.48 
45 K. Moriyasu, “Hong Kong trimmed to ‘one country, 1.5 systems’”, Nikkei, 14 
June 2017.
46 G. Cheung  and T. Cheung, “Outgoing Hong Kong Legco chief  warns ‘one 
country, two systems’ will fall apart if  Beijing keeps on interfering”, South China 
Morning Post, 30 August 2015.
47 D. Lague, J. Pomfret and G. Torode, “How murder, kidnappings and 
miscalculation set off  Hong Kong’s revolt”, Reuters, 20 December 2019.
48 J. Creery, “In Pictures: 130,000 protest looming China extradition law, say 
organisers, after Hong Kong jails Umbrella Movement leaders”, HKFP - Hong 
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On 9 June, a million marched. On 12 June, tens of thousands 
surrounded the legislature building to block legislators from 
going in for a scheduled reading of the bill. The police used 
excessive force against protesters in full view of local and 
international media.49 At nightfall, the government labelled the 
day’s events as “riots” and charged the arrested for “rioting”. 
Carrie Lam vowed to push on but then “suspended” the bill 
on 15 June. Hongkongers were both emboldened by the small 
“victory” and enraged by police brutality on 12 June. Up to 2 
million demonstrated on 16 June to demand that Hong Kong 
authorities formally withdraw the extradition bill, open an 
independent investigation into police abuses, drop the “riot” 
characterisation of the protests, release those arrested on rioting 
charges, and reopen a dialogue on genuine universal suffrage 
truncated in 2014. Mrs. Lam stubbornly refused to formally 
withdraw the bill until 4 September.50
Protests lasted through the summer, fall, winter, and into 
2020. Confrontations spread from the streets to train stations, 
shopping malls and residential buildings across all major 
neighbourhoods. Police resorted to massive arrests andm 
brutal beatings of protesters. In turn, black-clad people (some 
were protesters and some could be agents provocateurs) threw 
firebombs, stabbed officers, meted out vigilante justice to 
regime supporters, desecrated Beijing’s authority symbols, and 
vandalised pro-Beijing businesses.51
Chinese leaders, who had been alarmed by the non-violent 
Umbrella Movement, were shocked by the much more volatile 
anti-extradition protests. Beijing resorted to the same response, 
doubling down on the erosion of “two systems” which had 
Kong Free Press, 28 April 2019.
49 B. Marcolini et al., “Did Hong Kong Police Use Violence Against Protesters?”, 
New York Times, 14 July 2019. 
50 V. Tin-bor Hui, “Beijing’s All-Out Crackdown on the Anti-Extradition Protests 
in Hong Kong”, China Leadership Monitor, no. 62, 1 December 2019.
51 V. Tin-bor Hui, “Hong Kong citizens just voted for more democracy. What 
happens now?”, Washington Post, 26 November 2019.
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fuelled protests in the first place. Most notably, Beijing came 
out of the shadows to exercise thinly-veiled direct rule since 
the million-strong march on 9 June. The Central Coordination 
Group for the Hong Kong and Macau Affair chaired by 
Vice Premier Han Zheng began to mete out directives from 
Bauhinia Villa, Beijing’s command centre in Shenzhen across 
the border.52 Before Carrie Lam “suspended” the extradition 
bill, she had met with Han. When a Reuters correspondent 
asked in August if Mrs. Lam had the autonomy to withdraw the 
bill, she had no answer.53 She admitted in a leaked audio that, 
“Once an issue has been elevated … to a sort of sovereignty and 
security level …, the political room … for manoeuvring is very, 
very, very limited”.54
At the same time, HKMAO in Beijing called rare pressers to 
comment on the unfolding unrests. On 29 July, spokespersons 
highlighted the central government’s support for the Mrs. Lam 
government and the Hong Kong police to stop unlawful acts.55 
On 6 August, they reiterated their backing of Carrie Lam and 
called for the police to end the protests, which had “changed 
in nature”.56 On 8 August, then HKMAO Director Zhang 
Xiaoming said the protests were taking on “colour revolution 
characteristics” and warned that “the central government will 
not sit back and do nothing”.57 The then Liaison Office Director 
Wang Zhimin added that the “patriotic camp” should join in this 
52 D. Lague, J. Pomfret and G. Torode, “How murder, kidnappings and 
miscalculation set off  Hong Kong’s revolt”, Reuters, 20 December 2019.
53 “HK leader challenged: ‘Have your hands been tied by Beijing?’”, Reuters, 13 
August 2019.
54 “Exclusive: The Chief  Executive ‘Has to Serve Two Masters’ - HK leader 
Carrie Lam – Full Transcript”, Reuters, 12 September 2019.
55 SCMP Reporters, “As it happened: how Beijing expressed ‘resolute support’ 
for Hong Kong’s government”, South China Morning Post, 29 July 2019.
56 SCMP Reporters, “Hong Kong’s government and police ‘completely capable’ 
of  protecting law and order, key Beijing official says, ruling out need for PLA to 
be mobilized”, South China Morning Post, 6 August 2019.
57 K. Cheng, “Beijing deems Hong Kong protests ‘colour revolution,’ will not 
rule out intervention”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 8 August 2019.
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“war of life and death”.58 On 12 August, HKMAO spokespersons 
remarked that the protests were showing “signs of terrorism”.59 
On 3 September, they continued to condemn the “political 
terror” and entreated all branches of government and public 
agencies to join forces to end the violence and restore order.60 
During the summer of 2019, there was much talk of whether 
the People’s Liberation Army would crush the protests.61 On 
31 July, the Chinese military garrison in Hong Kong released 
a video showing Chinese troops practicing anti-riot drills in a 
Hong Kong-like urban setting.62 In early August, 12,000 troops 
participated in more drills in Shenzhen.63 The Basic Law states 
that PLA troops stationed in Hong Kong are for defence only 
and “shall not interfere in local affairs”. Article 14 also states 
that the Hong Kong government may ask for “assistance from 
the garrison in the maintenance of public order and in disaster 
relief ”. With a Chief Executive who defers to Beijing, the 
central government can easily direct the local government to 
request PLA assistance. Article 18 of the Basic Law provides a 
bypass option. During war or “by reason of turmoil … which 
endangers national unity or security and is beyond the control 
of the Region”, the NPC Standing Committee can declare an 
emergency and apply “the relevant national laws”. Labelling the 
protest a “colour revolution” with “signs of terrorism” could 
certainly give Beijing a route to stage a military intervention. 
Nonetheless, Beijing has other means before resorting to this 
58 Ibid.
59 S. Zheng, “Beijing warns of  ‘signs of  terrorism’ in violent unrest in Hong 
Kong”, South China Morning Post, 12 August 2019. 
60 SCMP Reporters, “As it happened: All branches of  government, including 
judiciary, must help stop violence and restore order, says Beijing’s top Hong 
Kong office”, South China Morning Post, 3 September 2019.
61 M.C. Davis and V. Tin-bor Hui, “Will China Crush the Protests in Hong 
Kong?”, Foreign Affairs, 5 August 2019.
62 “Chinese army’s Hong Kong garrison releases video showing anti-riot drills, 
featuring tanks”, South China Morning Post, 1 August 2019.
63 P. Zhang, “Chinese police mass 12,000 anti-riot officers in Shenzhen for drill”, 
South China Morning Post, 6 August 2019.
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“nuclear” option. Even in Mainland China, Beijing has refrained 
from deploying the military in Tiananmen-like fashion since 
1989. The authorities have perfected “stability maintenance” to 
put down “mass incidents” by the police and thugs.
Beijing’s public security ministry joined the coordination 
group in fall 2019. When Carrie Lam met with Xi on 4 
November, Minister of Public Security Zhao Kezhi was in 
attendance.When Mrs. Lam delivered her annual work report 
to Xi on 16 December, Guo Shengkun, China’s “security 
czar” (Zhao’s boss) and head of the Central Political and Legal 
Affairs Commission, was present.64 When Hong Kong’s new 
police chief Chris Tang made his first official visit to Beijing 
on 6-7 December 2019, he met with the same Guo and Zhao 
in addition to the then HKMAO Director. Their involvement 
indicates that law enforcement, an area that should be highly 
autonomous, has come under Beijing’s direct purview.
Beijing officials from Xi on down have urged the Hong 
Kong police to “punish violent and unlawful acts” and praised 
their “forceful actions” against “rioters”.65 The rhetoric has been 
accompanied by action. Once “Asia’s finest”, the Hong Kong 
police overnight became “just another Mainland force” acting 
with impunity.66 The police seem to have followed a decapacitation 
campaign to inflict maximum injuries on protesters and 
supporters.67 They have regularly fired tear gas, rubber bullets, 
beanbag rounds, and water cannons at high velocity, at head 
level, and at close range, so that even technically non-lethal 
crowd-control weapons could cause severe injuries.68 Since 11 
64 J. Mai, E. Xie and Wi. Zheng, “Why was China’s domestic security chief  Guo 
Shengkun at Carrie Lam’s meeting with Xi Jinping?”, South China Morning Post, 
17 December 2019.
65 L. Zhou, “Xi Jinping again backs Hong Kong police use of  force in stopping 
unrest”, South China Morning Post, 14 November 2019.
66 C. Yeung, “HK Police Now Just Another Mainland Force”, Voice of  Hong Kong, 
13 August 2019.
67 V. Tin-bor Hui, “Beijing’s Hard and Soft Repression in Hong Kong,” Orbis, 
forthcoming in 2020.
68 K.K. Rebecca Lai and A. Ramzy, “1,800 Rounds of  Tear Gas: Was the Hong 
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August 2019, police officers have routinely beaten the arrested 
with batons, pinned them down and rubbed their faces against 
the ground, pepper-sprayed their wounds, and broken their 
bones.69 Officers even fired live ammunition with near-fatalities 
on 1 October and 11 November. Chris Tang, immediately after 
his promotion to police chief in November 2019, assumed 
command of an assault on protesters at Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University. Hong Kong analysts suspect that he had a deliberate 
strategy to lure hardcore protesters to “defend” Polytechnic and 
then arrest them.70 In this single operation, the police detained 
1377 and registered 318 people below the age of 18.71 When 
supporters poured into nearby areas to divert the police, police 
vehicles rammed them at high speed, causing a stampede with 
traumatic injuries.72 In detention centres, the arrested have been 
routinely denied access to families and lawyers for hours.73 A 
significant number of detainees have been subject to further 
bone fractures, brain bleeding, and sexual assault.74
The police have targeted not just protesters, but also medical 
volunteers, social workers, elected councillors, reporters and 
passersby. Moreover, they have colluded with gangsters who 
indiscriminately beat up locals with wooden sticks and metal 
Kong Police Response Appropriate?” New York Times, 18 August 2019.
69 B. Marcolini, “‘I Was Begging for Mercy’: How Undercover Officers in Hong 
Kong Launched a Bloody Crackdown”, New York Times, 22 September 2019.
70 Chi-kin Lo, “What was the purpose for manufacturing the Polytechnic tragedy?’ 
Hong Kong Citizen News, 19 November 2019.
71 “A total of  over 10,000 petrol bombs seized from various universities, 4000 
from Poly U, 5,890 protesters arrested since June”, Dimsum Daily Hong Kong, 29 
November 2019.
72 K. Cheng, “Hong Kong police accused of  driving vehicles into protesters 
during clearance operation”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 19 November 2019.
73 K. Leung, “Arrest and detention of  children over Hong Kong’s anti-
government protests raise questions on police treatment and legal process”, 
South China Morning Post, 20 October 2019.
74 Amnesty International, “Hong Kong: Arbitrary arrests, brutal beatings and 
torture in police detention revealed”, 19 September 2019; C. Lau, “Hong Kong 
student who accused police of  sexual violence against protesters has taken legal 
advice and plans further action”, South China Morning Post, 11 October 2019.
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rods at the suburban Yuen Long train station on 21 July.75 Critics 
point out that Chris Tang was once the district commander 
of Yuen Long and may be linked to the mobs.76 When Lam’s 
deputy, Chief Secretary Matthew Cheung, apologised that “the 
police’s handling fell short of the citizens’ expectations”, he was 
rebuked publicly by the Police Inspectors’ Association.77 A week 
later, the police themselves indiscriminately charged with batons 
and tear gas at crowds in the same station,78 leading to headlines 
likening the officers to thugs.79 On 31 August, a larger scale of 
indiscriminate attacks by uniformed police on passengers took 
place in the downtown Prince Edward station.80
Equally worrisome is the biased enforcement of the law. By 
February 2020, the police have arrested more than 7200 and 
charged over 2000 for unlawful assemblies, rioting, possession 
of weapons, and arson, which could carry a maximum sentence 
of 10 years to life imprisonment. Few (if any) abusive officers 
and gangsters have faced justice.
Beyond hiding behind Hong Kong’s own police, Beijing has 
progressively asserted “one country” over “two systems”. On 4 
October, Carrie Lam invoked emergency powers to prohibit 
protesters from wearing masks, paint or any other face covering. 
A local court ruled on 18 November that the mask ban was 
unconstitutional.81 The NPC Standing Committee quickly 
75 Hong Kong Connection, “721 Yuen Long Nightmare”, Radio Television Hong 
Kong, 4 October 2019; B. Marcolini et al., “‘Please Stop Beating Us’: Where 
Were Hong Kong’s Police?”, New York Times, 29 July 2019.
76 Lok-kei Sum, “Hong Kong police chief  tangles with opposition councilors for 
second time in week over force’s handling of  protests”, South China Morning Post, 
22 January 2020.
77 C. Leung and V. Ting, “Police anger after Hong Kong No 2 Matthew Cheung 
says sorry for Yuen Long attack response”, South China Morning Post, 26 July 2019. 
78 S. George et al., “Riot police clash with protesters as Hong Kong march 
descends into violence”, CNN, 28 July, 2019.
79 L. Kuo, “‘No difference’: Hong Kong police likened to thugs after Yuen Long 
violence”, The Guardian,  28 Jul. 2019.
80 L. Kuo and E. Hale, “Hong Kong protests: riot police storm metro station 
with batons”, The Guardian,  1 September 2019.
81 M.C. Davis, “In Hong Kong, Beijing’s tough talk could spark a constitutional 
Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong’s “Infinity War”?76
declared that “no other authority [except itself ] has the right 
to make judgments and decisions” regarding the consistency of 
Hong Kong’s laws with the Basic Law.82 This is the latest assault 
on the independence of Hong Kong courts.
On 1 November, 2019, the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Central 
Committee of the Communist Party formally announced that 
it would “exercise governance” in Hong Kong.83 It also called 
for national security legislation, patriotic education and other 
measures to end the turmoil. The decision may not introduce 
a new policy, but it formalizes the ultimate absorption of the 
“two systems” by the “one country”.
In early 2020, Beijing appointed senior-ranked leaders, Xia 
Baolong and Luo Huining, to head HKMAO in Beijing and 
Liaison Office in Hong Kong, respectively. Xia, who served as 
the vice-chairman of China’s top political advisory body, the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, is a close 
ally of Xi Jinping and has a track record of demolishing crosses 
and churches in Zhejiang. Luo Huining has reiterated the 
Plenum’s decision to introduce national security law.84 These 
reshuffles signals even more airtight control over Hong Kong.
The Struggle Against Further Descent into 
“One Country, One System” 
Hong Kong’s “one country, 1.5 systems” has gone far down the 
road toward Macau’s “one country, one system”. Beijing’s harsh 
crackdown on mass protests has sped up the process. Yet, the 
extradition bill, if passed, would have achieved the same result. 
crisis”,  Washington Post, 21 November, 2019.
82 T. Cheung , W. Zheng,  and G. Cheung, “ ‘No other authority has right to 
make judgments’: China slams Hong Kong court’s ruling on anti-mask law as 
unconstitutional”, South China Morning Post, 19 November 2019.
83 “Press conference of  the Fourth Plenum of  the 19th Central Committee of  
the Chinese Communist Party”, Xinhua, 1 November 2019.
84 I. Marlow and C. Che, “China’s Top Official in Hong Kong Urges Enacting 
National Security Law”, Bloomberg, 20 January 2020.
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The main difference is that Hong Kong would have fallen 
quietly in the alternative scenario. The fiery protests have made 
it impossible for the international community to pretend that 
“one country, two systems” is still alive and well.
Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam asked in early 
December 2019: “which aspect of Hong Kong residents’ 
freedom was eroded?”. She added that “We have press freedom 
… freedom to participate in rallies and marches … religious 
freedom … a high degree of freedom in many aspects”.85 Hong 
Kong commentator Michael Chugani counts the ways “how 
Hong Kong has lost its freedoms”: police refusal to grant no-
objection permits to protests, thus rendering them “unlawful 
assemblies” subject to arrests; police order to end an approved 
protest mid-way and arrest of the organizer; police targeting of 
journalists who cover protests; police banning of political items 
at the lunar new year fair at Victoria Park; government denial 
of entry to foreign democracy advocates.86 In addition, the 
police have harassed and arrested young students who formed 
peaceful human chains, taken down “Lennon Walls” of artwork 
and post-it messages, and destroyed makeshift memorials 
for those who died in suspicious circumstances.87 Beijing 
has coerced private companies such as Cathay Pacific to fire 
employees who participated in general strikes and posted pro-
democracy messages on social media. Most of all, police and 
thugs have undermined the most foundational of all freedoms 
– the freedom from fear of physical attacks.
The omni-present protest slogan, “Reclaim Hong Kong, 
Revolution of Our Times”, may seem like a declaration of 
independence to Beijing, but means a yearning for the Hong 
85 K. Cheng, “Hong Kong’s freedom has not been eroded, says leader Carrie Lam 
says after US passes law in support of  protesters”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 
3 December 2019.
86 M. Chugani, “How has Hong Kong lost its freedoms? Let me count the ways”, 
South China Morning Post, 23 January 2020.
87 R. Wong, “In Pictures: Officers ‘moved some objects,’ say police after force accused 
of  destroying tributes to dead student”, HKFP - Hong Kong Free Press, 3 March 2020.
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Kong system of rule of law, impartial police force, independent 
judiciary, and unfettered free press.
The protests have quieted down in early 2020. Core 
protesters have suffered high attrition with over 7000 arrests 
and thousands of injuries. Supporters have turned to other, 
hopefully more sustainable actions than confronting riot 
police. A pro-democracy “yellow economic circle” is created to 
connect like-minded businesses and customers, and employers 
and employees, and, at the same time, to boycott pro-regime 
“blue businesses”.88 Various professions have formed new 
unions, so as to launch more effective strikes. The local elections 
held on 24 November allowed pro-democracy candidates who 
campaigned on the five protest demands to capture 391 out of 
452 seats and dominate 17 of 18 District Councils.89 Newly 
elected councillors have tried to hold the government and the 
police more accountable despite obstructions from loyalist 
police officers and civil servants. At the same time, they are 
strategising how to win in both functional constituencies as 
well as geographical constituencies in the upcoming Legislative 
Council in September 2020. It will continue to be an uphill 
struggle. Luo Huining already declared that the opposition 
would never be allowed to take over half of the seats to 
“seize governance power”.90 Luo has also ridiculed medical 
workers’ strike to demand border closure as a “political form 
of coronavirus”.91 Although the Basic Law guarantees the right 
to strike, Beijing officials have condemned strikes as “radical 
violations of public order and laws, challenging the bottom 
lines of ‘one country, two systems’ and national dignity”.92 If 
88 H. Beech, “Yellow or Blue? In Hong Kong, Businesses Choose Political Sides”, 
New York Times, 19 January 2020. 
89 B. Tai Yiu-ting, “This Was Hong Kong’s Most Important Election Ever”, New 
York Times, 25 November 2019.
90 “Luo Huining met social groups, claimed that the opposition could not seize 
governance power”, Now TV, 21 February 2020.
91 “HK troublemakers are a political virus: Luo Huining”, Radio Television Hong 
Kong, 20 February 2020.
92 SCMP Reporters, “Hong Kong’s government and police ‘completely capable’ 
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the authorities block peaceful, legal channels with harsher 
repression, Hong Kong will only become more ungovernable. 
Conclusion 
Beijing wants Hong Kong to become a “good boy” like Macau, 
but Hong Kong has chosen the Taiwan model. Taiwan has 
helped to magnify Beijing’s broken promises by campaigning 
on “today’s Hong Kong, tomorrow’s Taiwan”. As Hongkongers 
celebrated Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-Wen’s victory in January 
2020, they expressed hope for a better future by flipping the 
slogan to “today’s Taiwan, tomorrow’s Hong Kong”. In rejecting 
“one country, two systems”, Taiwan is also forcing Beijing to re-
calculate if it really wants to “kill” Hong Kong and then resort 
to war to unify Taiwan to Mainland China.
Hong Kong’s battle with Beijing is less hopeless than it may 
seem because of its international status. Through the summer 
and fall of 2019, the US Congress tabled, debated, and passed 
the “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act” in 
the face of rising police brutality. The Act mandates annual 
certification of Hong Kong’s autonomy if the city is to keep 
its separate customs status, which has allowed Chinese elites to 
access dual use technologies, raise funds, park clean and corrupt 
money.93 Beijing should be mindful that, if it treats Hong Kong 
like Macau or even Zhejiang, the rest of the world would follow 
suit and rescind Hong Kong’s unique customs status. Macau 
already suffers from a gradual convergence of its sovereign 
ratings with China’s because of its “large and rising economic, 
financial, and socio-political linkages with Mainland China”.94
of  protecting law and order, key Beijing official says, ruling out need for PLA to 
be mobilised”, South China Morning Post, 6 August 2019.
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5.  Hong Kong: One Country, 
     Two Systems, Three Challenges
 Alicia García-Herrero, Gary Ng
As the confrontation between the United States and China 
escalates, it is almost impossible – and naïve – to think Hong 
Kong can hide from the crossfire. Although Hong Kong’s 
role as an intermediary between Chinese and Western capital 
has served different stakeholders well so far, the growing risk 
of a new cold war might change the balance of power. Since 
the Trump administration took office in early 2017, small 
flames have started to grow bigger and creep towards trade, 
technology and potentially finance in the near future. The 
calls to redefine the American political view of Hong Kong’s 
position are only growing louder. Although many of the latest 
developments are little more than gestures that will depend on 
subsequent implementation in practice, the signing into law of 
the “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act” in 2019 
shows greater pursuit of geopolitical influence and regional 
competition between the two largest powers in the world. 
The Covid-19 outbreak has only exacerbated an existing 
problem of strategic competition between the US and China, 
which may further escalate from a soft decoupling in the trade 
war to a hard decoupling in government driven and subsidised 
swift of factories. A change of trade pattern could weaken 
the intermediate role of Hong Kong. The faster developing 
deglobalisation means more localised production and stronger 
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emphasis on manufacturing in the future. Higher concern on 
regional security and tides of geopolitical risks mean the role of 
Hong Kong could be further undermined with fading mutual 
interest between world powers. The US government decision 
to exclude Hong Kong from the Pacific Light Cable Network 
(PLCN) in April 2020 is only one of the few surface signs of 
deeper cracks and shows Hong Kong may no longer be the 
first choice in many new aspects and mean opportunities to 
Asian peers, such as Singapore and Taiwan. For Hong Kong, 
the question is really where to stand in the world.
A Changing Geopolitical Environment
Based on the Sino-British Joint Declaration (JD) signed in 
1984, the Basic Law and the US-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 
are two key components for maintaining the current status. 
The Act states the US is obliged to maintain its bilateral ties 
with Hong Kong in fulfilment of the JD. Such international 
recognition is guaranteed by the perception of the West, 
especially by the US. The heated-up discussion and the new 
Act on Hong Kong’s special status are now on Congress’s radar, 
with cross party support from Democrats and Republicans.
Economically, Hong Kong clearly shares more direct mutual 
benefits with Mainland China than the US, but the ultimate 
cornerstone is the internationally recognised special status, 
which is also why Mainland Chinese firms are more active. 
Indeed, the special status granted by the US to Hong Kong 
after the handover of sovereignty is vital in past and future 
economic development. 
Recent turmoil has prompted analysts to review Hong Kong’s 
economic importance to China, with many concluding what 
was the once “Pearl of the Orient” is no longer important. The 
contribution of Hong Kong’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
to the rest of China has declined from 16% in 1997 to 3% in 
2019. Statistics seem to provide a clear view of Hong Kong’s 
waning relevance, but they fail to tell the full story. A narrow 
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comparison solely focusing on GDP masks Hong Kong’s 
economic and financial relevance, not only to Mainland China, 
but also to the rest of the world. To gauge Hong Kong’s real 
relevance, we need to move beyond GDP and consider other 
areas, especially the soft spots for China.
Closer Trade Relationship with China
From the construction of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau 
Bridge to the extension of high-speed rail, the one and only goal 
for recent infrastructure projects seems to be better connections 
with Mainland China. The two iconic links costs $27 billion or 
20% of the most recent fiscal reserves. Public expenditure on 
infrastructure on average accounted for 16% of total spending 
between 2009 and 2019, approximately 10% higher than the 
previous decade. This heavy spending echoes the government’s 
drive to facilitate closer trade relationships and greater 
movement of people between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China. However, such spending was also to the detriment of 
much needed spending on healthcare and social welfare. As 
a result, Hong Kong’s economy is now more dependent on 
Mainland China than ever.
For trade, the interdependence between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China is now higher than with the US. After China 
joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, its 
share of trade in Hong Kong has increased from 40% to 51% 
in 2019. The surge is closely tied to the rapid growth of the 
Chinese economy and its increasing share of the global market, 
especially in manufactured goods. By contrast, the share of total 
trade between Hong Kong and the US has fallen from 14% to 
8% in the same period. 
Re-exportation of goods by Hong Kong clearly reflects the 
trade pattern between the US and China: the value of Chinese 
goods re-exported to the US through Hong Kong is four times 
greater than that of American goods re-exported to China. 
However, growth of re-exports of Chinese goods to the US 
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through Hong Kong has continued since the trade war began, 
but not the other way around. In other words, Hong Kong 
continues to serve as a springboard for Mainland China to 
export to the US.
Such dependency is also seen in the retail sector, which 
provides 15% of total employment. Since 2003, Hong Kong’s 
retail sales have expanded by 2.5 times. The key reason is the 
launch of the Individual Visit Scheme1 with Mainland China 
after the SARS crisis; this scheme boosted retail sales, although 
it divided opinion on the future social costs. As a result, Hong 
Kong’s retail sales are now increasingly linked to visitor arrivals, 
especially Chinese tourists.
The number of Chinese tourists has grown from 8.5 million 
in 2003 to 43 million in 2019, meaning a percentage rise from 
54% to 78%. This already heavy reliance has only grown over 
time, but it does vary among different tourism-related sectors. 
Retail sales have the highest dependency with 91% of external 
spending coming from Mainland China, while for restaurants 
and hotels, the figures are 67% and 52% respectively.
A Magnet for Investment
While it is easy to build more ports or bridges, it is difficult to 
replicate intangible advantages. 
Building the globally relevant offshore centre that is Hong 
Kong has been based on the free movement of capital, while 
Mainland China still maintains a relatively closed capital 
account. This means Hong Kong can facilitate China’s access 
to foreign capital.
Hong Kong has been an important hub for China to attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and invest abroad. In 2018, 
50% of inward FDI and 54% of outward FDI for China was 
1 The Individual Visit Scheme was first introduced in four Guangdong cities on 
28 July 2003 and allows residents from Mainland China to visit Hong Kong in 
their individual capacity. The Scheme is now expanded in 49 cities.
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channelled through Hong Kong. This is partly a result of the 
introduction of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement 
(CEPA), which has given Hong Kong preferential tax treatment 
in trade and investment in Mainland China since 2003. This 
has attracted both foreign capital and Chinese firms to set up 
offshore branches and invest back in Mainland China. The 
share of Mainland China in the number of offices (including 
small local offices) has also increased from 9% in 2000 to 18% 
in 2017.
This high share is representative of Hong Kong’s intermediary 
role between China and the West, which is due to the trust 
Chinese and foreign firms have in Hong Kong’s institutional 
framework and funding pool for their investments. Specifically 
in terms of mergers and acquisitions, Hong Kong has played a 
key role as its unique status has facilitated overseas purchases 
for Chinese firms.
Irreplaceable Financial Firewall
Hong Kong’s offshore financial sector has been extremely 
successful so far, at least when measured by the increase in size. 
The bank assets-to-GDP ratio expanded from 462% in 2002 to 
846% in 2018. Since the introduction of the currency board in 
1983, Hong Kong has managed to keep the currency pegged 
and stabile amid the political risks that have arisen from time 
to time. As the Hong Kong dollar (HKD) is closely pegged to 
the United States dollar (USD), access to Hong Kong’s banking 
system and currency essentially means access to hard currency.
Driven by a desire for access to USD, Hong Kong’s financial 
system is now increasingly dominated by Mainland Chinese 
banks. At the same time, overseas bank assets held by Mainland 
Chinese banks are heavily concentrated in Hong Kong. This 
significant exposure means the destiny of Hong Kong as an 
offshore financial centre affects China even more than it affects 
the rest of the world. Mainland Chinese financial institutions 
have expanded 3.2 times since 2010, reaching $1.2 trillion with 
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a much higher growth rate than the rest of the banking sector.
While Hong Kong’s bank assets have grown very fast in 
aggregate terms, China’s have outpaced all other countries, 
with their share of assets in Hong Kong’s banking sector having 
increased from 22% in 2010 to 37% in 2018. This surge is in 
stark contrast to European banks, which have barely increased 
their exposure in Hong Kong, and to the much slower pace of 
Japanese and American players.
The role of Hong Kong in financing Mainland Chinese firms 
is also indispensable. Between 1997 and 2018, 33% of equity 
financing took place in Hong Kong. Hong Kong has been a 
key funding venue as the onshore Chinese market sometimes 
faces restrictions as regulators try to curb stock price volatility. 
In fact, equity financing in China’s onshore market continued 
to decline from its peak in 2015 and fell behind Hong Kong 
in 2018.
Hong Kong is also by far the largest offshore centre for bond 
placement by Chinese companies. While offshore issuance is 
limited in size due to the rapid growth of the onshore bond 
market, contributing 9% of total issuance between 1997 and 
2018, offshore bond financing is very hard to replace. The share 
of offshore bond issuance increased in 2014 and has remained 
high ever since. 
Looking at the different industries, Chinese financial 
institutions and property developers are the most dependent 
on Hong Kong. While banks fundamentally need access to 
USD liquidity due to the higher share of overseas loans, real 
estate developers are more likely to be pushed by tight domestic 
financial conditions.
On policies, Hong Kong plays an important role for Mainland 
China in renminbi (RMB) internationalisation and further 
opening up through the Bond and Stock Connect schemes. For 
the former, Hong Kong is the home of 54% of offshore RMB 
bond issuances and more than half of RMB deposits offshore. 
In addition, Bond Connect has become increasingly important 
for foreigners to enter the onshore bond market.
Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong’s “Infinity War”?86
Therefore, Hong Kong’s role as China’s financial arm for the 
rest of the world has helped Mainland China to keep its financial 
sector insulated without suffering the negative consequences of 
such isolation, i.e. limited access to finance or difficult access to 
assets in the rest of the world. In essence, Hong Kong has long 
been China’s financial firewall.
Radar On
While the mutual economic benefits between Hong Kong and 
Mainland China seems to be crystal clear, costs may slowly 
outweigh gains for the US. When the Trump administration 
announced the first batch of tariffs in March 2018, Hong Kong 
was rarely included in steel and aluminium tariffs, of which 
there was hardly any local production. In addition, Hong Kong 
is now included in the strategy of “Congressional Action To 
Raise Our Competitive Game” in the recent annual report 
published by the US Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China (CECC). Although the CECC has no direct influence 
on government policies, the stronger language reflects the 
increasingly tough stance on China.
The US-China trade war and the increasing gains made by 
Mainland China raise several questions about Hong Kong’s 
special status. While the risk of an immediate revocation of the 
Act remains low, the US could use Hong Kong as a bargaining 
chip in ongoing negotiations and competitions with China. 
Aside from the most drastic measure (revoking the Act, which 
could harm US interests too), the US could exert stricter export 
controls on sensitive technology, as in the arrangement with 
Macau, and tighter checks on the rules of origin for goods 
imported from Hong Kong. Macau has a similar Policy Act 
arrangement with WTO membership and it is treated as an 
independent customs territory, but export control policy is 
applied by the US.
Focusing on product structure, electrical machinery and 
telecoms constitutes 65% and 14% of re-exports from Hong 
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Kong to Mainland China as of November 2018. Although the 
imbalance is partly a result of China’s role in the global supply 
chain, it also shows the reliance of technology related imports 
from Hong Kong. As a separate customs territory, Hong Kong 
is subject to less export controls from the US than Mainland 
China is.
Depending on the region and the end-user, the US currently 
has a strict export control system for sales of advanced 
technologies with different tiers depending on how sensitive 
the product is. The licencing system is divided into military 
use and dual use (or civilian) technologies, of which the latter 
is governed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and 
is the focus of our report. In 2017, $42.1 billion (2.7% of total 
exports) was exported under government licences and 0.4% was 
exported under export licences. Although the share may look 
small, the advanced equipment could be vital in the production 
chain and technological advancement.
With an export control system in line with international 
standards, Hong Kong has been generally trusted by western 
countries in terms of compliance. Hong Kong imported $174 
million worth of products with export licences in 2017, despite 
its small economic size. The scale is 58% of what Mainland China 
imported from the US with export licences and contributes a 
greater share to imports from the US. When compared to its 
Asian peers, this is slightly less than South Korea and Taiwan 
but more than India. As its economic structure is heavily biased 
towards finance and trade, it is more likely that Hong Kong re-
exports instead of using domestically. This means Hong Kong 
can buy advanced technological items, such as spacecraft and 
semiconductor related-equipment based on US regulations.
However, the approval rate of export licences in Hong Kong 
has so far been low at 75%, which is far less than 83% for 
Mainland China and the global average of 85%. While there is 
no official data to explain the low approval rate for Hong Kong, 
the US has the right to deny transactions involving prohibited 
parties, end-uses and circumstances, as well as for national 
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security reasons. The closer ties to Mainland China have led 
to increased concern in the US as to whether Hong Kong can 
maintain its export control due diligence, as mentioned in 
Congress reports. Such worries will only grow stronger given 
the broad tech containment of China by the US. 
The report on intellectual property rights by the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) has clearly shown the US 
is going to adopt a tougher stance on technological transfer. 
For Hong Kong, this latest development included discussions 
in early December 2018 between the US and the Hong Kong 
government on the proper implementation of sanctions and 
concerns about shell companies. That said, there is a greater 
likelihood of export controls for sensitive technology as well as 
policy changes on Hong Kong if the above concern is not fully 
addressed.
Although advanced technologies only account for a small 
share of Hong Kong’s imports from the US, a sudden change 
in US policy or a “natural” sudden reduction in such imports 
could be a major negative signal for Hong Kong. Trade tensions 
will lead to increased scrutiny on Mainland China’s sensitive 
imports from the US, which will increase Mainland China’s 
dependency on Hong Kong for such imports. But the US 
can increase its scrutiny, as shown by the already low approval 
rate of export licences granted to Hong Kong. A similar story 
is happening for FDI where Hong Kong firms are treated as 
Mainland Chinese capitals (Australia as an example). This could 
also include a potential change in visa policies, preferential 
treatment in travel and study, and passing new acts on the 
relationship between the US and Hong Kong.
Conclusion: Three Challenges
Given current geopolitical tension, Hong Kong’s role has 
become more important and increasingly challenging. The 
good news is there are not many places like Hong Kong. Free 
trade movement and international capital flows have provided 
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a key comparative advantage. A low and simple tax system has 
been a magnet for attracting businesses. However, in a world 
dominated by two contending powers, it seems clear Hong 
Kong will have a hard time having its cake (Mainland Chinese 
business) and eating it (keeping its special status with the US). 
Unfortunately, Hong Kong has limited choices and it will 
encounter greater global, regional and local challenges because 
of geopolitical risks.
From a global perspective, the dark clouds over of tension that 
loom over the US and China seem unlikely to disappear anytime 
soon. Hong Kong might be small economically, but it is definitely 
at the core of interests between the two powers, especially in 
trade, technology and finance. Its closer relationship with 
Mainland China means Hong Kong is likely to face restrictions 
if the US decides to take a stricter approach to containing China. 
Cases similar to the 2019 case of an Iranian oil tanker that 
might have tried to stop in Hong Kong will challenge this Asian 
financial hub’s ability to make decisions in compliance with US 
sanctions, which can be even more damaging if extended to the 
banking sector since the HKD is closely pegged to the USD. 
Further integration of the Greater Bay Area (GBA) will only 
intensify such concern as the boundaries between Hong Kong 
and Mainland China continued to blur.
The relationship with Mainland China is all about the 
balance of economic benefits that Hong Kong can take in 
exchange for other goals beyond local demand. The proposed 
integrated GBA will pose a challenge for how Hong Kong can 
maintain its own system, especially since the conditions for the 
free movement of production factors in the GBA are different to 
those of the San Francisco Bay or Tokyo Bay areas. Integration 
without change is problematic, but any changes that influence 
how investors view the rule of law will lessen the key advantages 
of Hong Kong, the GBA and Mainland China.
In the medium term, the key stumbling block is the free 
flow of production factors in the GBA, in particular between 
Hong Kong and Guangdong. If the free movement of labour 
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and capital were achieved, the convergence of income per 
capita should benefit the poorer cities in Guangdong more. 
Hong Kong might also benefit, but less so in relative terms. 
Free movement of labour is a lesser problem than capital, which 
seems impossible as it either requires Guangdong to fully open 
its capital account or Hong Kong to close it, at least partially. 
The former seems unlikely in Mainland China today and the 
latter seems risky for Hong Kong and the GBA as it would 
make it less attractive to overseas investors and reduce Hong 
Kong’s role as an intermediary for capital. 
Last but not least, the deadlock in political reform and social 
unrest would continue to pressure Hong Kong, especially as 
these are basically structural issues the governments have long 
neglected. Aging demographics, healthcare and housing have 
been untouched problems. In the past 20 years, the share 
of spending on social welfare and healthcare has remained 
practically unchanged despite a rapidly ageing population. The 
working population has already started decreasing, with a greater 
share of elderly. Land supply has also been a persisting issue 
fuelling rocketing home prices that are less and less affordable. 
Solving long neglected problems and catching up on “missing” 
social investment from the past is key to restoring business and 
consumer confidence. However, it is also clear why some of 
these key problems were ignored in the past.
All in all, Hong Kong’s special status with the West could 
weaken or disappear over time if the current trend continues. 
The Covid-19 outbreak has further raised the stakes for the 
US or China to change the current global regime, which mean 
almost certain crossfire on Hong Kong. The questions are 
only on the timing and the magnitude. In the most extreme 
scenario, a change in recognition by the US could trigger a 
butterfly effect in Hong Kong’s international status, should the 
US come to believe the current ties with Hong Kong are no 
longer beneficial. Such a butterfly effect in Hong Kong’s global 
status may be behind the negative investment sentiment that 
has accompanied Hong Kong of late and is likely to continue. 
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6.  Is the Greater Bay Area China’s Future? 
Dingding Chen, Junmin Wang
In recent decades, in addition to launching the famous Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI), China has attempted to reshape the 
Pearl River Delta, which includes Hong Kong, Macao, and 
nine cities in Guangdong province. The goal is to create a single 
economic entity called the Greater Bay Area (GBA). According 
to the “Development Outline”1 published by China’s State 
Council on 18 February 2019, the GBA will represent China in 
industrial competitions worldwide and provide opportunities 
for internal economic transformation. In terms of socio-
economic factors such as population size, economic power, the 
number of “Fortune 500” companies present and technological 
innovation, the GBA has everything necessary to compete with 
the world’s top metropolitan industrial areas, including San 
Francisco, Tokyo and New York, though it still lags behind in 
terms of per capita economic indicators.
Challenges such as intra-regional competition and the 
differences in Hong Kong’s and Macao’s administrative and 
value systems via-à-vis Mainland China may nevertheless prove 
fatal to the success of the GBA if forward-looking policies are 
not implemented in the short run.
1 Outline Development Plan for the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater 
Bay Area
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Introducing the GBA
The Greater Bay Area includes Hong Kong and Macao, China’s 
only Special Administrative Regions (SARs), along with nine 
cities in Guangdong province: Shenzhen, Huizhou, Dongguan, 
Guangzhou, Zhaoqing, Foshan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, and 
Zhuhai (see Fig. 6.1). The GBA occupies 56,000 square 
kilometres, is home to a population of over 70 million people, 
and generates a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over 10 
trillion yuan.2 Though covering only 0.6% of Chinese territory, 
this one area produces 13% of the country’s GDP.3 In terms 
of talent concentration, innovation, and capital, the GBA is 
leading the process of technological innovation and industrial 
modernisation.4 Before the concept of the GBA was officially 
adopted on 1 July 2017, an economic zone had already existed 
in the area for at least 40 years under another name: the “Pearl 
River Delta”. Together with the “Beijing-Tianjin Metropolitan 
Area” and the Shanghai-centred “Yangtze River Delta”, the 
GBA acts as an “economic engine”; the GBA for the south of 
China while the other two areas serve the north and the east 
respectively. The economic vitality of the Pearl River Delta 
made Guangdong province an economic powerhouse for 29 
consecutive years. In 2019, the area’s GDP reached a staggering 
$1.56 trillion,5 establishing it in 13th place among the world’s 
economies. In comparison, Guangdong’s 2019 GDP ($1.52 
trillion)6 is higher than Spain’s ($1.43 trillion) and Australia’s 
($1.42 trillion) in 2018 and similar to South Korea’s ($1.61 
trillion) and Russia’s ($1.66 trillion) in 2018.7
2 Overview, Greater Bay Area. 
3 Framework Agreement on Deepening Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau 
Cooperation in the Development of  the GBA.
4 Ibid.
5 Stats from the Census and Statistics department of  Hong Kong SAR, 
Governo da Região Administrativa Especial de Macau and Stats Department of  
Guangdong Province.
6 http://stats.gd.gov.cn/gmjjzyzb/content/post_2884502.html
7 Gross Domestic Product, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf
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Fig. 6.1 - Map of the Greater Bay Area
Source: www.bayarea.gov.hk
The “Framework Agreement on Deepening Guangdong-
Hong Kong-Macao Cooperation in the Development of 
the Greater Bay Area” modernised the Pearl River Delta and 
marked the formal accession of Hong Kong and Macao to 
the project. Hong Kong’s financial and shipping sectors and 
Macao’s entertainment industry (which rivals that of Las Vegas) 
have given the area an international aura. The GBA therefore 
has enough strength to compete with the other world-class 
metropolitan areas (see Tab. 6.1).
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Tab. 6.1 - Comparing the World’s Biggest Metropolitan Areas
Source: www.statista.com, the Greater Bay Area Council,  
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Fortune China
Note: Data for the Tokyo Bay Area refer to 2016, while data for San Francisco,  
New York and the GBA refer to 2017
Table 6.1 shows the extent to which the GBA is already a 
leading player in terms of population and economy, indicators 
that give it an asymmetric advantage compared to the other 
metropolitan areas. While low GDP per capita appears to be 
the GBA’s weakness (the area still lacks economic efficiency), it 
also suggests that the area has enormous potential for growth. 
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Why is the GBA an Opportunity for 
Mainland China?
The real advantage of the GBA is not its size or scale. While 
New York’s strong suit is finance (fourteen of the twenty-
two Fortune 500 companies in New York are financial and 
insurance companies8), San Francisco is known as a technology 
hub thanks to its famous “Silicon Valley”9 and the profits of its 
tech companies. Tokyo is rather different as it mainly consists of 
manufacturing industries (e.g., steel, chemicals, semiconductors, 
automotive, and electronics). Unlike its competitors, the GBA 
has achieved a rare balance in industrial development. Twenty 
Fortune 500 companies are located there10 but these cover 
almost all major industrial sectors, including the automotive, 
home appliance, real estate, internet, and finance sectors. This 
industrial diversification allows the GBA to compete globally 
and at the highest level in multiple sectors. 
On the east bank of the Pearl River Delta we find Hong 
Kong. The island’s financial status is on a par with that of 
New York or London, while its ports and shipping industry 
rival Singapore. At the same time, in Guangdong province, 
Shenzhen’s tech and internet companies, including the likes 
of Tencent, DJI, Huawei, and ZTE, represent increasingly 
fierce competition for Silicon Valley. In particular, Huawei’s 
leadership in commercialising 5G communication technologies 
has caused alarm in the United States and allied nations,11 since 
5G is widely predicted to be the trigger for the next wave of 
technological innovation and for a new economic boom. Just a 
8 Fortune 500, https://fortune.com/fortune500/2019/search/?hqcity=New%20
York
9 The Silicon Valley, located in the south side of  the San Francisco Bay, is the 
world-renowned technology and innovation center of  the United States.
10 7 in Hong Kong, 7 in Shenzhen, 3 in Guangzhou, 2 in Foshan and 1 in Zhuhai, 
data from Fortune 500 official website.
11 “U.S. Urges Allies to Avoid Using Huawei Equipment, WSJ Says”, Bloomberg 
News, 23 November 2019.
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few years ago, Chinese and American supremacy in 4G directly 
contributed to the rise of the two countries’ mobile Internet 
economies and spawned many new industrial developments, 
like mobile payment, the sharing economy and the knowledge 
economy. Lastly, Dongguan, an industrial city of eight million 
people in the north of Shenzhen,12 is known as the “world’s 
factory”. Though not home to any major national brands, it is a 
manufacturing hub for leading brands from all over the world.
On the west bank of the Pearl River Delta lies Guangzhou, 
a 2200-year-old city now transformed into a metropolis with a 
population of 16 million.13 Guangzhou has long been known 
for its “Canton Fair”, which every year attracts buyers from 
all over the world. Today, it is highly competitive in bio-
medicine, internet technology and the automotive industry, 
with Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Fiat and other car makers all 
owning huge factories there. The autonomous driving start-up, 
Pony.ai, has just received an investment of $462 million from 
Toyota, boosting its value to $3 billion and making it one of 
the top artificial intelligence companies in the world.14 Foshan 
and Zhuhai, also on the west bank, are home to two of the 
world’s top 500 manufacturers of home appliances, Midea and 
Gree. As these two companies have become more competitive, 
their peers in Tokyo have been forced to move further up the 
industry. Lastly, the area is also home to the world’s largest 
wholesale cloth market, furniture factory, and production site 
for architectural ceramics. In parallel, Macao offers the best 
tourism and gambling services in the eastern hemisphere, 
capable not only of satisfying local demand but of attracting 
capital from all over East Asia. 
In brief, the GBA is the only economic zone in the world 
with a diversified supply chain. Manufacturers of products as 
different as automobiles and mobile phones can find numerous 
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advantage of the GBA compared to the other three world-class 
metropolitan areas. 
Such an industrial structure fosters deep and frequent 
integration within the GBA and this leads to the development 
of new technologies and products. Such exchanges in turn allow 
the GBA to lead emerging industries like artificial intelligence, 
intelligent manufacturing, and the Internet of things. For 
example, Pony.ai and WeRide independently mastered the 
fourth level of vehicle autonomy,15 competing with their 
American counterparts Google and Tesla. In addition, BYD, 
a Shenzhen-based carmaker, has become one of the world’s 
largest manufacturers of electric cars and batteries, just behind 
Tesla.16 Lastly, WeChat, a network application enterprise based 
in Guangzhou, has one of the world’s largest user bases (around 
1.16 billion per month),17 second only to Facebook and 
WhatsApp. Thanks to this vast user base, WeChat is assisting 
the GBA in the process of digitalising various government 
services, public transport interfaces, medical care and education 
systems. 
Thanks to the area’s dynamic approach to technological 
innovation, similar to that of Silicon Valley, China’s central 
government sees the GBA as a leading force in the country’s 
industrial modernisation.
Which Challenges Does the GBA Face?
Despite its many positive qualities, the GBA also faces a number 
of challenges. 
Firstly, while the GBA is extremely competitive in many 
sectors, it still lacks certain core technologies in the field of 
15 https://pony.ai/zh/tech.html
16 I. Wagner, “Electric Mobility - Statistics & Facts”, Statistica, 3 March 2020.
17 TENCENT, Tencent Holdings Limited, https://cdc-tencent-
com-1258344706.image.myqcloud.com/uploads/2020/03/18/260f6aa7d4b04 
c146e6001549fd23dbc.pdf
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semiconductors and chips. US sanctions on ZTE in 2018 almost 
drove the company to the brink of collapse and exposed China’s 
weakness in these areas. If Chinese companies fail to break 
through in this field, the domestic tech-manufacturing industry 
risks complete dependence on foreign imports. Recently, 5G 
chips designed by HiSilicon (a fabless semiconductor company 
owned by Huawei) have been installed in many electronic 
products.18 HiSilicon is growing at an annual rate of +40% and 
is rapidly becoming the world’s fifth-largest IC design supplier.19 
In the field of chip manufacturing, Guangzhou has also broken 
ground on two semiconductor fabrication plants.20 Although 
such efforts in chip design and manufacturing may not turn the 
GBA into a world-class producer, they are at least a good plan B 
and an effective bargaining chip in talks on sanctions.
Secondly, the GBA is struggling with regional administrative 
barriers. Within the area, cities compete with each other for 
resources and economic advantages. This trend is worrisome, 
as it risks leading to an inefficient allocation of resources. In 
the early 2000s, in an effort to connect the Pearl River Delta, 
Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and the west bank of Macao, the region 
spent $20 billion21. The Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, 
connecting Hong Kong and Macao to the city of Zhuhai in 
Guangdong took ten years to build but left out Shenzhen, a 
densely populated city in Guangdong that is economically 
more competitive than Zhuhai. In the absence of Shenzhen’s 
traffic, the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge has only been 
used as a sightseeing route, and has not yet served its intended 
purpose as an “economic bridge”. As a result, the authorities 
are now forced to build a separate bridge linking Shenzhen to 
the west bank. Due to Guangzhou’s busy ports and shipping 
routes, though, this project risks endless delays. There is good 
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reason to fear that internal competition within the GBA may 
never cease.
Thirdly, the GBA faces challenges in the form of Hong 
Kong’s and Macao’s different administrative and value systems 
vis-à-vis Mainland China. The two SARs have completely 
different administrative systems, and Western-oriented values. 
However, the agreement on Hong Kong negotiated between 
Mainland China and the United Kingdom in 1997,22 and that 
which China concluded with Portugal on Macao stipulate 
that these differences will be resolved in fifty years. Finding a 
creative solution that integrates the two cities into the regional 
development plan therefore needs to be a top priority for 
decision-makers. Although the GBA aims to attenuate the 
differences between the parties, recent protests in Hong Kong 
clearly show that the most “international” and “Western-
oriented” segments of the island’s population are having a hard 
time accepting full integration with Mainland China. While 
no quick fix is likely, a solution might be found in the long 
run if Hong Kong’s economic dependence upon the mainland 
encourages ideological acceptance.
Just as China hopes to gain advantages and influence in 
international trade through the BRI, which channels attempts 
to export excess capacity to Eurasia and the Indian Ocean 
rim, internationalise the RMB and expand its international 
reach, the GBA improves China’s chances to play a greater role 
in global value chains. China’s ability to overcome the many 
challenges that surround the GBA will be key to turning such 
“hopes” into reality.
Conclusion
China’s Greater Bay Area is a development strategy at national 
level. The development plan concerns some 70 million people 
in nine cities of Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macao 
22 https://wenku.baidu.com/view/afe8998503020740be1e650e52ea551811a6c91e.html
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and affects an area that accounts for one tenth of the Chinese 
economy. The GBA is key to the country’s new round of reforms 
and opening up and involves tens of thousands of enterprises in 
various industries and fields. The Greater Bay Area development 
plan outlines five strategic spheres of action: the construction 
of a dynamic, world-class city cluster; an international science 
and technology innovation centre with global influence; 
strategic support for the construction of the Belt and Road; 
the demonstration of in-depth cooperation between the 
mainland, Hong Kong and Macao; and the creation of an area 
with a good quality of life, work, and travel. The government 
evidently attaches great importance to the area’s construction 
and development as it brings real opportunities for economic 
growth and regional integration.
The development of the Greater Bay Area will play on local 
advantages. Its industrial diversity will allow it to compete in 
multiple sectors on a world-class level. The GBA is the only 
economic zone in the world that can form a complete industrial 
chain within its own region. With better connections in 
manufacturing, transport and travel, the area’s potential can 
be realised in full. Nevertheless, there are challenges ahead. 
Regardless of advanced and comprehensive industrial sectors, 
the GBA lacks core technologies, specifically in the field of 
semiconductors. Regional administrative barriers and huge 
differences in values between the mainland and Hong Kong 
and Macao also threaten future development.
Considering the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on 
the global economy and the recent unrest in Hong Kong, it is 
becoming increasingly urgent to identify the right approach to 
promoting the construction of the Greater Bay Area.
7.  Hong Kong in China’s Current 
     “Opening-Up” Strategy
Alessia Amighini
While the decisive role of Hong Kong in China’s growth 
experience so far is unanimously acknowledged,1 there is 
much less agreement on the position and function of Hong 
Kong in China’s current growth strategy as well as its future 
place in China’s opening up-trajectory. A lively scholarly 
debate has been going on for a few years about whether or not 
China still needs Hong Kong, and why, with widely diverging 
positions. That debate has been partly inspired by the series of 
political contestation movements in Hong Kong since 2014, 
whose origin and interpretation are closely related to the 
evolving relationship between mainland China and the Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong Kong, a status which it 
has now had for more than two decades. A further motivation 
for the debate, perhaps not coincidentally around the same 
years, is the renewed vigour of China’s opening-up policies 
through international trade and foreign direct investments, 
much as in the past, but now wisely arranged under the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI).
1 See among others S. Yun-Wing and E. Song, The China-Hong Kong Connection: 
The Key to China’s Open-Door Policy, Cambridge University Press 1991; and J.Y.S. 
Cheng, The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in Its First Decade, City University 
of  Hong Kong Press, 2007.
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After briefly summarising2 the channels – finance, trade, 
rule of law – through which China’s economic growth strategy 
has continues to pivot around Hong Kong, this chapter will 
try to disentangle the bewildering divergence of views on the 
relative importance of Hong Kong for mainland China today; 
in a sense they focus on different aspects of the changing role 
of Hong Kong, which is still essential to the very peculiar 
opening-up strategy that China has been following so far, but 
not to the extent that it used to. The chapter will then argue 
that Hong Kong is and will still be very relevant in China’s 
future “opening-up”, but it will lose its unique position, as 
Beijing has been diluting the functions of Hong Kong as a 
financial hub to a number of other locations outside of China 
through the so-called financial pillar of the BRI, while at the 
same time embedding the benefits of its trade and legal status 
into mainland China through the Greater Bay Area.
Hong Kong as a “Financial Firewall”3 
for Mainland China
In the extensive economic literature on how China has integrated 
into the world economy by extending its participation into 
global networks of trade, finance and investment over the 
last four decades, Hong Kong is acknowledged as not just an 
important part, but the most essential part. This does not imply 
that Hong Kong was solely responsible for all the unprecedented 
economic achievements by the People’s Republic of China, but 
it did shape the way these achievements were accomplished. 
2 Only as much as it is needed to support the flow of  the discussion that follows, 
while referring to Chapter 6 by Alicia Garcia-Herrero and Gary Ng in this volume 
for a more in-depth assessment, although their focus is on the current challenges 
to Hong Kong from the policy development in mainland China, whereas this 
chapter focuses on the challenges for mainland China due to the unique special 
economic status of  Hong Kong.
3 Chapter 6 in this volume.
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First and foremost, Hong Kong has been essential for foreign 
direct investment inflows and outflows, which has proven a 
very powerful engine behind China’s growth, due to the massive 
learning and technological spillovers onto domestic firms. 
Hong Kong continues to be a pivot for China’s foreign direct 
investments (FDI), both inward and outward. Although the 
share of inward FDI going to mainland China through Hong 
Kong has been declining over time, due to the lower barriers 
for firms investing directly in China, outward FDI from China 
still benefit from the efficient regulatory environment and 
professional services in Hong Kong. According to the Ministry 
of Commerce of China (MOFCOM),4 over 58% (around $70 
billion) of China’s outward FDI flows went to Hong Kong in 
2018. As a result, by the end of 2018, the stock of China’s FDI 
in Hong Kong reached $622 billion.
As for international trade, after four decades of selected 
opening-up policies, China became the world’s largest trading 
economy (for merchandise) in 2013 – just 12 years after 
acceding to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Due to 
the special customs administration in Hong Kong, entrepôt or 
warehouse trade through the SAR has progressively diminished 
since China joined WTO in 2001, but not so for the role of 
Hong Kong as a facilitator of trade links between China and 
the rest of the world. This has been achieved through a model of 
development that has promoted low-price exports so as to earn 
enough foreign currency – United States dollar (USD) – to pay 
for imported technology and industrial machinery and input, 
which China once lacked the productive skills and capabilities 
to produce by itself. The key to a massive increase in exports 
was the possibility to manage the exchange rate so as to prevent 
it from appreciating. With increasing worldwide demand for 
Chinese goods, appreciation would have been the expected 
fate for the renminbi, and this would have gradually eroded 
4 Ministry of  Commerce of  the People’s Republic of  China, 28 February 2019, http://
www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/tongjiziliao/sjtj/ndyuxgjm/201903/20190302844193.
shtml
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Chinese price competitiveness. The importance of managing 
the exchange rate was thus essential for China to become a great 
trading nation.
In economic history all great trading nations had international 
currencies: within the British Empire, the pound sterling was used 
in all international transactions and to settle international trade. 
The pound remained the world’s main trading and reserve 
currency as long as the British economy remained at the centre 
of the world economy, both for production and finance. When 
Britain was overtaken by the United States in economic size, 
industrial capacity and trading power, the pound downgraded 
from international to national status, while the USD became 
the leading international currency, both for trade and for 
reserves. As Paola Subacchi states (2017),
the intertwined development of Britain and it pound, and then 
of the United States and its dollar, emphasises the anomaly of 
China’s development ... China is now the world’s largest trading 
nation and a powerful country in geopolitical terms … but … it 
does not have a currency that reflects and complements its rise 
to the status of international power.5 
The renminbi is still not convertible, still not traded 
internationally, nor it is used as a reserve currency, although 
in December 2015 it was included in the basket of currencies 
that compose the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)6 at the IMF. 
All international transactions with China as a partner have for 
a very long time been and still mostly are being held in USDs.
China’s opportunity become a great trading nation without 
an international currency has largely relied on the role of Hong 
Kong as an offshore centre, both for trade settlement and for 
international renminbi circulation. To understand this, one 
5 P. Subacchi, The People’s Money, Columbia University Press, 2017, p. 71.
6 The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement its member countries’ official reserves. The value of  the SDR is 
based on a basket of  five currencies – the USD, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, 
the Japanese yen, and the British pound sterling.
Between Politics and Finance: Hong Kong’s “Infinity War”?106
has to consider that a huge trade surplus in USDs would have 
implied massive costs for China. Rapid accumulation of USDs 
from export earnings, while keeping the exchange rate under 
managed floating, required vast sterilisation from the People’s 
Bank of China (PBOC), China’s central bank – i.e. the PBOC 
had to buy enormous amounts of dollars in exchange for 
renminbi and then had to issue renminbi-denominated bonds 
to avoid an excessive increase in the money supply at home.
In order to reduce the great macroeconomic costs of being 
a large trading nation without an international currency, 
China adopted ways to reduce its reliance on the USD as a 
trading currency on the one hand, while ensuring the cross-
border circulation of the renminbi on the other. However, the 
monetary authorities in the Mainland still wanted to avoid 
the risk of financial instability associated with a traditional 
currency liberalisation. Nor did they want to let the renminbi 
exchange rate float on the currency markets. To achieve this, 
two schemes were designed, the renminbi cross-border trade 
settlement scheme to increase the use of the renminbi as a 
trading currency and the renminbi offshore market with the aim 
to increase the cross-border use of the renminbi. The former is 
a mechanism to use the renminbi to pay for imports through 
an authorised bank in Hong Kong. The scheme was launched 
in 2009 to improve trading conditions by providing liquidity 
in renminbi, at a time when the financial crisis had reduced 
liquidity for trade transactions; it was primarily and initially 
intended to settle trade contracts with neighbouring countries. 
The second scheme is a market for the renminbi and renminbi-
denominated assets outside of mainland China, started in 
2007, so as to provide Chinese firms investing abroad with the 
possibility to raise funds on the capital markets, while making 
it possible for non-Chinese firms to hold assets in renminbi. 
The renminbi circulating offshore (CNH) was convertible to 
foreign currencies, unlike the onshore renminbi (CNY). 
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Hong Kong was crucial to both schemes. Hong Kong’s 
unique status has served as a buffer between the Chinese and 
international markets in the so-called two-tier or two-track 
strategy for increasing the international circulation of the 
renminbi, without liberalising the capital account by making 
the renminbi convertible. So, while it is true that the PRC 
became the world’s largest trading nation and the second largest 
economy by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while Hong Kong 
today accounts for 2,7% of China’s economic size compared to 
18,4% back in 1997,7 it is equally true that mainland China 
managed to handle such a huge amount of trade transactions 
without a convertible currency thanks to the above-mentioned 
schemes, both of which centred on Hong Kong. The offshore 
renminbi market allowed China’s state-owned enterprises to 
list shares and raise funds in Hong Kong, the most developed 
offshore market for renminbi-denominated bonds, the so-
called Dim Sum market (to distinguish it from the onshore 
bond market, the so-called Panda market). The offshore market 
allowed mainland China to interact with international markets 
while protecting the domestic market from the potential 
instability of a liberalised capital account. Hong Kong still 
serves as the main offshore renminbi business, with still the 
largest offshore liquidity pool outside the Mainland. 
This approach allowed China to interact with international 
currency and financial markets through a kind of “financial 
firewall”. As a result, China’s share of global debt and equity 
markets increased sharply. At the end of 2018, China’s bond 
market accounted for 12.6% of the world total, compared to 
1.2% in 2004. Comparatively, in 2018 the United States, the 
European Union and Japan accounted respectively for 40.2%, 
20.9%, and 12.2%, all below their totals in 2004, when they 
accounted respectively for 42.2%, 26.5% and 18.7%. 
7 N. Sin, “Explainer: How important is Hong Kong to the rest of  China?”, 
Reuters, 5 September 2019.
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As true as it is that Hong Kong acted as a buffer between 
China and international markets, its unique position has been 
facing increasing competition from other offshore renminbi 
markets, and therefore is being diluted compared to the past, 
which explains why the current views about whether China still 
needs Hong Kong range very widely.
Re-Addressing the Debate: How Much Does China 
Still Need Hong Kong?
Understanding the essential role of Hong Kong in China’s past 
growth and the specific channels and mechanisms through 
which the Mainland benefited from such a special offshore 
financial centre makes it possible to re-frame the recent debate 
on Hong Kong‘s continued importance. The opposite ends of 
the spectrum are nicely summarised and epitomised by two op-
eds. According to Eswar Prasad,8 one of the firmest advocates 
of the decline of Hong Kong’s special economic and financial 
status, China’s economy and financial markets have expanded 
so rapidly that the relative size of Hong Kong is much smaller 
compared to the past in relative terms (the value of new public 
listings in Hong Kong was higher than any other exchange 
worldwide in 2018). But Prasad goes further than those who 
believe Hong Kong’s importance has diminished with its 
relative size. He emphasises two developments. One is the 
changing willingness of foreign firms and investors to deal with 
the Mainland, regardless of “deficiencies in its corporate and 
public governance”,9 with the aim to benefit from its increasing 
market potential. The second development is an attempt by 
Beijing to promote Shanghai as an international financial centre, 
so as to create a rivalry between the two centres. With Shanghai 
allowed to trade in renminbi and renminbi-denominated 
8 E. Prasad, “Why China no longer needs Hong Kong”, New York Times, 3 July 
2019. 
9 Ibid.
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assets with offshore centres, the once unique status of Hong 
Kong will be lost. Hence the conclusion that China no longer 
needs Hong Kong the way it once did. Moreover, anticipating 
the end of the special status in 2047, the central government 
would “envision an entirely different purpose for Hong Kong 
… to showcase the efficacy of China’s version of the rule of 
law, in which the legal system serves the economy by enforcing 
property and contractual rights but is ultimately subservient to 
the Communist Party”.10 
While many other advocates of the Hong Kong-no-longer-
special-to-China view fall in the absolute size fallacy, Prasad 
emphasises the function of Hong Kong to China, which has 
little to do with its economic size in terms of GDP, but much 
more with the amount of international trade and financial 
flows between China and the rest of the world travelling 
through Hong Kong. In terms of those flows, China still very 
much relies on Hong Kong as a financial centre, but is trying to 
reduce its financial dependence on it by creating more offshore 
financial centres to handle renminbi liquidity overseas. Those 
other centres are de facto competing with Hong Kong, thereby 
threatening the unique status it has had so far. However, no 
other centre in mainland China has the status to compete with 
Hong Kong, not even Shanghai nor Shenzhen. Although they 
might leverage their economic size and financial linkages to 
attract economic activities and listed firms, they do not have the 
essential elements that make Hong Kong unique, i.e. a wide-
ranging set of characteristics – encompassing financial power 
and financial infrastructure, rule of law, efficient bureaucracy 
and regulatory framework, trade and logistics capacity. Shanghai 
or Shenzen simply do not have this.
So, the Hong Kong-no-longer-special-to-China advocates 
tend to overemphasise the capacity of other offshore centre 
to replace Hong Kong and eventually push it out of its 
monopolistic position, which is still very far from reality. 
10 Ibid.
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On the other side of the debate, the advocates of the Hong 
Kong-still-special-to-China view realise the uniqueness of such a 
comprehensive offshore centre, which has no single counterpart 
in mainland China. In their view, Beijing will want to insulate 
itself from the potential vagaries of international financial 
markets, and will be reluctant to allow outflows of capital from 
the country in search for a better return on investment (both 
of them very distant on the horizon). This view is effectively 
presented by Tianlei Huang,11 who elaborates on the function 
of Hong Kong as a market capitalist centre that allows the 
Mainland to leverage its rule of law, while keeping it silent at 
home: “The Chinese leadership realizes that for the sake of its 
own prosperity, China still needs a capitalist Hong Kong … 
with a strong and unwavering commitment to its rule of law, 
the key to Hong Kong’s economic success”.12 
One of the most important reasons why Hong Kong still 
maintains a crucial role for China is its system for registered 
International Public Offerings (IPO), compared to the more 
cumbersome and arbitrary approval system in mainland China. 
According to the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC),13 “Shanghai has begun to test IPO registration, but 
it still remains unknown when all listings on the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges will become registration-based”. A 
great many of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) rely on 
the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), where they are 
either directly headquartered or have one of their subsidiaries, 
which are listed on the SEHK. This system has been very 
important for Chinese SOEs to circumvent the approval system 
on the Mainland and even more to access a leading global stock 
exchange in the world’s freest economy for 25 consecutive years 
since 1995, according to the World Economic Forum.
11 T. Huang, Why China still needs Hong Kong, Petersen Institute for International 
Economics, 15 July 2019.
12 Ibid.
13 As reported by T. Huang (2019) based on http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/
zjhpublic/zjh/201903/t20190301_351633.htm, China Security Regulatory 
Commission, 1 March 2019.
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The SEHK makes it possible for a vast number of 
Chinese companies (both incorporated in the Mainland and 
incorporated abroad but controlled by Chinese entities) to raise 
capital, including SOEs, which thereby bypass the widespread 
condition of financial repression in the Mainland. According 
to the HKEX Group data, more than 30% of SEHK’s total 
market capitalisation was accounted for by Chinese companies 
at the end of February 2020, compared to 16% in 1997. 
However, it is also true that the share of Chinese companies 
out of total SEHK market capitalisation had steadily risen for 
the first decade after the handover up yp 51% in 2008, from 
which it has since declined. This is arguably the result of the 
declining importance of the SEHK for Chinese companies, 
while it shows the emergence of an array of competing centres 
for raising capital, as we will argue in the next section. 
Conclusion: A New Role for Hong Kong, 
Still Essential but Not Unique
Within China’s “opening-up” policies, the role of Hong Kong 
is still very important. However, such a crucial role raises a 
number of challenges for China in the mid- to longer term. 
To the extent that the special position is linked to the SAR 
status, which is due to expire by 2047 according to the Joint 
Declaration (JD) signed by Great Britain and the PRC back 
in 1997, Beijing has already started to prepare for the time 
when the “one country, two systems” model will no longer 
be grounded in the JD. This has become all the more urgent 
due to the recent waves of social unrest in Hong Kong, which 
are to a great extent related to the widespread perception and 
sentiment among Hongkongers about the intent by Beijing to 
progressively phase out the unique characteristics to the SAR.
We argue that the progressive downgrading of Hong Kong’s 
role as the chief offshore centre for the Mainland is achieved 
in two ways. The first is to start embedding Hong Kong 
into the Mainland so as to link and transfer its comparative 
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advantage onto the PRC, or part of it. This is done through 
the mechanism of the special free areas, namely the Greater 
Bay Area (GBA), a new development framework that has been 
designed since 2017 in a large area centered on the Pearl River 
Delta. The GBA comprises eleven metropolises over 56,000 
square kilometres, 70 million inhabitants, and a gross domestic 
product of over $1,500 billion. The goal is to transform the area 
of Hong Kong, Macao and nine cities in the southern province 
of Guangdong (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Zhongshan, 
Jiangmen, Zhaoqing, Foshan, Dongguan and Huizhou), 
which already contributes to 12% of the Chinese GDP, in the 
world leader for technological patents, seeding of startups, 
investments in innovative companies,  and digitalisation. 
Beijing wants to transform this cluster of cities, businesses, 
startups, finance and infrastructures into the Silicon Valley 
of the future. GBA is a three-pronged development strategy: 
in addition to economic development and political control, 
technological innovation is a chief objective. Beijing wants to 
open the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Macao corridor 
for innovation and technology, with policies that promote the 
exchange of talent, capital, information and technology, and 
develop a great regional data center. Beijing hopes that the huge 
GBA project will help it gradually align its legal and regulatory 
regime with global standards for trade, finance, taxation, and 
other transactions, while maintaining the financial stability 
secured by a closed capital account.
The second way to prepare for 2047 is to weaken the 
comparative advantages of Hong Kong by expanding and 
upgrading the functions of other centres to make them compete 
with Hong Kong. This is done within the so-called financial 
pillar of the BRI, which includes the creation of a number of 
offshore clearing centres, none of them fully comparable to 
Hong Kong, but each of them getting a slice of the offshore 
renminbi business. These centres have expanded the range of 
markets that serve as a buffer between the domestic market and 
international markets. The chief instrument so far has been 
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the signing of central bank currency swap agreements. Since 
2009, China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements 
with thirty-two counterparties. These swaps aim to support 
trade and investment and to promote the international use of 
renminbi. As China limits the amount of renminbi available to 
settle trade, the swaps have been used to obtain renminbi after 
these limits have been reached. 
These two approaches aim to internalise as much as possible 
the comparative advantages of the efficient, free-market Hong 
Kong system into the mainland system of financial repression 
and closed capital accounts, while at the same diluting the 
financial and regulatory power of Hong Kong by creating 
many other offshore centres. Such an ambitious strategy also 
has a number of challenges. First, in order to continue being a 
great trading nation without an international currency, China 
must find ways to increase the international use of the renminbi 
(which is very different from advancing internationalisation 
of the renminbi). According to the Bank for International 
Settlements,14 the renminbi accounted for just 2.1% of total 
daily foreign-exchange trading in 2019 – far behind the USD 
(44%), the euro (16%), and the Japanese yen (8.5%). Secondly, 
and related to the first, China will also need have a more 
balanced current account, after decades of running huge trade 
surpluses.15 Too large a surplus will require gigantic efforts to 
manage with a managed floating exchange rate system, and is 
too strongly linked to the dollar system, in the eyes of Beijing. 
Much of China’s ability to navigate international markets while 
maintaining a strong hold on the economy through what 
will likely become a ‘one country, a multi-layered system’ will 
depend on the success of Beijing’s masterplan.
14 V. Sushko, “Triennial Central Bank Survey of  Foreign Exchange and Over-
the-counter (OTC) Derivatives Markets in 2019”, Triennial Survey, Bank 
International Settlements (BIS), 8 December 2019.
15 “2019 External Sector Report: The Dynamics of  External Adjustment”, 
External Sector Report, International Monetary Fund (IMF), July 2019. 
Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations for the EU
Alessia Amighini, Giulia Sciorati
At the time of writing (May 2020), the coronavirus pandemic 
is spreading around the world and taking uncontested centre 
stage in national and international policy debates. Unlike in 
2019, when protests in Hong Kong and elsewhere erupted 
worldwide, fear and restrictive measures have been keeping 
almost three million people away from the streets for the last 
several months.1 Nonetheless, as it had been at the start of what 
has now come to be known as the 2019 “global protest wave”,2 
Hong Kong remains on the frontline of political contestation 
worldwide.
Last summer, yellow umbrellas and balaclavas saturated 
global media. Today, an indirect effect of the pandemic is that it 
seems to be keeping political contestation at bay. If questioned, 
most people would assume that the Hong Kong protests ceased 
as swiftly as they had started, but they would be wrong. In 
fact, the protests never entirely died out, neither when the first 
cases of coronavirus infection were registered in Wuhan last 
December, nor when the World Health Organization declared 
a pandemic in early March. Indeed, as Joshua Wong, leader 
of the 2014 “Umbrella Movement”, claimed, Hong Kong is 
1 L. Lacina, “Nearly 3 billion people around the globe under COVID-19 lockdowns 
- Today’s coronavirus updates”, World Economic Forum, 26 March 2020.
2 R. Wright, “The Story of  2019: Protests in Every Corner of  the Globe”, The 
New Yorker, 30 December 2019.
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fighting an “infinity war”,3 which the coronavirus fuelled 
instead of halted.
By any standard, the Hong Kong government put in place 
cutting-edge health measures to prevent the virus from spreading. 
Yet criticism arose from civil society, as the city’s government 
maintained open four passageways to mainland China. The 
move, highly appreciated by Beijing, was made in an effort to 
avoid any concession to “localism,” the Hong Kongese political 
movement that aims to preserve the city’s autonomy and local 
culture. The price the Hong Kong government had to pay was 
small waves of localised protests. Although international media 
might have forgotten political contestation in the city, protests 
are still alive and well. 
In an unprecedented global context of forced immobility 
and emergency policies, the main takeaway that transpires 
from the chapters of this volume is the following: Hong Kong 
protests are not an isolated political movement, but the result 
of much wider political instability. The several successive 
waves of street demonstrations over the years are just the 
most evident symptom of a chronic instability. In the eyes 
of Beijing’s leadership, Hong Kong protests are not simply a 
“political problem” to be solved, but the distillate of a much 
wider political situation to be managed: the future of the “one 
country, two systems” model. That model is not confined to 
Hong Kong, but encompasses the relations between Beijing 
and all the Special Administrative Regions of China (SARs), 
and also applies to those between Mainland China and Taiwan. 
Moreover, that model has important economic rationales that 
are still vital for the future of China as an economic power, in 
addition to the political motivation of pursuing unity under the 
Beijing umbrella.
As contestation is unlikely to be settled unless and until 
the relation between Mainland China and Hong Kong is 
3 R. Cohen, “The ‘Infinity War’ in the Streets of  Hong Kong”, The New York 
Times, 27 December 2019. 
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thoroughly re-discussed, violence is bound to emerge cyclically. 
Drawing upon the authors’ contributions to this report, we have 
compiled a few takeaway messages for the EU’s engagement of 
China.
Do not underestimate the 2047 deadline
2047 is rapidly approaching. When in 1997 Hong Kong ceased 
being a British protectorate, 2047 was set as the final date for 
the city to complete the transition to the People’s Republic of 
China, which, in practical terms, means eventual integration 
into the PRC. While this outcome is unassailable on purely legal 
grounds, being de facto included in the 1997 Joint Declaration, 
only in recent years have most Hongkongers begun to see this 
future as largely unacceptable. The youngest generations – most 
of whom are now in their twenties – have only now realised 
that their future is determined by that 1997 agreement, against 
which their parents and grand-parents had not objected for two 
reasons: they would not in any case be themselves affected by 
the 2047 unification, and they enjoyed too many economic 
benefits to find it useful to raise political contestations with 
Beijing. But now the younger generations of Hongkongers 
realise there is not so much uncertainty in Beijing regarding 
the political future of Hong Kong, and therefore they fear 
losing those political and economic benefits that make the city 
unique. As their concerns soon started resonating widely within 
civil society, they nullified all Beijing’s pre-emptive anti-protest 
efforts. Politics, economics and society have now converged 
in protesting against Mainland China, and many democratic 
countries around the world are supporting their claims. Until 
a compromise is discussed between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China, it is unlikely that the city will enjoy any form of stability: 
street demonstrations may indeed well become the battles in a 
very long-lasting war, which is bound to resonate well-beyond 
China’s borders.
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Prepare for spill-overs in Macau and Taiwan
Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong also 
suffer from identity clashes. Surveys conducted in Hong Kong 
over the years, for instance, indicate that the city developed a 
unique identity, which does not match Beijing’s.4 As Guido 
Samarani comprehensively explains in his chapter, the Hong 
Kong identity originates from centuries of exchanges between 
indigenous populations and Chinese migrants, eventually 
formalised under British colonialism. In light of this identity, 
when the time comes, Beijing should then reframe Hong Kong 
not as one of China’s two SARs, but more as a sixth “autonomous 
region,” granting Hongkongers better political representation in 
Mainland China as well as more local administrative autonomy, 
the benefits of which would also serve Beijing’s own interests. 
Indeed, Hong Kong’s hybrid status offers economic advantages 
that are still crucial to Mainland China. For instance, given its 
special status, the city has not been subject to the tariff increases 
that characterised the “trade war” between China and the US.
From Beijing’s perspective, reframing Hong Kong in 
Mainland China’s political system also would mark a step 
forward toward resolving the Macau and Taiwan issues. While 
Macau maintains better relations with Beijing, Taiwan has 
proven to be looking carefully at Hong Kong as a frame of 
reference for relations with Mainland China. After all, Beijing 
proposes to Taiwan the same model of governance currently 
in place in Hong Kong. Yet, after the 2019 protests, the “one 
country, two systems” model no longer seems to be a feasible 
option. Not only are Hongkongers accusing Beijing of slowly 
transforming the model into what Alessia Amighini in her 
chapter dubs “one country, one system”, but, during Taiwan’s 
2020 presidential elections, the model was also highly politicised, 
so much so that it cost the Beijing candidate’s victory. The 2019 
4 K. Cheng, “Hongkongers identifying as ‘Chinese’ at record low; under 10% of  
youth ‘proud’ to be citizens – poll”, Hong Kong Fress Press, 29 June 2019.
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protests in Hong Kong, in fact, uncovered the shortcomings of 
the “one country, two systems” model, pushing the electorate 
away from Mainland China. Today, Beijing also needs to face 
the lingering effects of the coronavirus crisis, which aggravated 
China-Taiwan relations. As the island is not a member of the 
United Nations (UN),5at the height of the pandemic Taiwan 
could not work closely with the World Health Organization 
nor the International Civil Aviation Organization, but had to 
rely on third-party information. Mainland China is commonly 
identified as the reason why the island does not enjoy UN 
membership, thus anti-Chinese sentiment is now at an all-time 
high. Finally, if Beijing plans to amend relations with Taiwan 
and stabilise Hong Kong, it can no longer afford merely to 
consider opening a dialogue with Hong Kong’s civil society, 
but needs to be ready to compromise the city’s full return under 
Mainland China’s sovereignty and end Hong Kong’s “infinity 
war” once and for all.
Think long term
As the Hong Kong protests are not an isolated political 
movement, but the result of much wider political concerns over 
an otherwise (legally) legitimate path towards the integration 
of Hong Kong with Mainland China in 2047,  any declaration 
of support from third countries to Hong Kong’s claims – as 
happened in 2019 with the US bill in favour of pro-democracy 
activists, which was followed by a declaration of political support 
from the European Parliament – must take into account that 
Beijing may formally raise issues on the grounds of its well-
established principle of non-interference. Therefore, handling 
the Hong Kong pro-democracy protests in isolation with 
respect to broader relations with China can only be a short-
term strategy, which may become unsustainable in the long-
term, even more so if the EU adopts an array of short-term 
5 S. Winkler, Taiwan’s UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be,  Brookings, 20 June 2012.
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strategies towards China that conflict with one another. The 
chief competing motivation is the high interdependence 
between many European economies and the Chinese economy, 
including Hong Kong. This was vividly expressed by an 
unnamed diplomat during an interview with the South China 
Morning Post in November 2019. Indeed, when asked about 
what motivated the European Parliament to sign a simple 
political support statement in favour of Hong Kong activists, 
he stated that “at the end of the day, I fear that the economic 
relationship is just too important”.6
If Europe continues pursuing conflicting short-term 
strategies, the outcome will be equally driven by short-
term economic interests instead of long-term economic and 
political interests. As long as European institutions, as well as 
other international institutions in charge of setting the rules 
of global governance will be accommodating to an economic 
interdependence determined by Beijing’s rules, at the end of the 
day, short-termism will translate into “letting others decide”.
Abandon an idiosyncratic approach towards China
On more economic grounds, European countries should better 
consider the evolving role of Hong Kong in the “one country, 
two systems” model, and its future. In the path towards 2047, 
the role of chief offshore centre for Beijing held by Hong Kong 
is being diluted by an array of foreign centres that act as offshore 
financial clearing houses for Mainland China. Promoting 
the international use of the renminbi through currency swap 
agreements and foreign pools of liquidity in offshore centres is 
thus a way for Beijing to circumvent the need to have offshore 
liquidity to support trade and investments, but without easing 
capital accounts. The increasing number of offshore centres, 
in Europe as well, are a way to indirectly support Beijing’s 
6 K. Helmer, “Europe reluctant to do more about Hong Kong for fear of  
Beijing’s reaction, say diplomats”, South China Morning Post, 20 November 2019.
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very peculiar strategy of increasing the international use of 
the renminbi, while avoiding a “riskier” internationalisation 
of the renminbi. As the “one country, two systems” model is 
progressively fading away, the rest of the world is being involved 
in a new model of China’s integration in the global economy—
an integration “with Chinese characteristics”. 
Continue pushing for stronger regulations 
on the export of sophisticated cyber surveillance 
technologies
The Hong Kong protests have shown the full extent of the 
relation between sophisticated cyber surveillance technologies 
and human rights. Indeed, from facial-recognition to social 
media monitoring, surveillance technologies played a major 
role in containing protests around the city. Yet, they have also 
offered tools that allowed for the intrusion in the privacy, data 
protection and freedom of assembly of citizens.
In 2018, the European Parliament implemented stronger 
rules on the export of the so-called “dual-use technologies” – 
that is, technologies that have civil and military purposes.7 Yet, 
calls from member states to loosen restrictions have followed 
this decision.8 The Hong Kong protests should then be 
examined as a practical example of the effects that the export 
of such technologies produce, which, at base, works against the 
EU’s own mandate towards human rights protection. Instead 
of being loosened, export restrictions and regulations on cyber 
surveillance technologies should be perfected, especially at 
a time when the Covid-19 pandemic brought discussions on 
7 European Parliament, Results of  roll-call votes - 23/11/2017 
8 Council of  the European Union, General Secretariat, WK55/2018 INIT, 
Limite, Working Paper, 15 May 2018. Paper for Discussion, For Adoption of  an 
Improved EU Export Control Regulation  428/2009 and for Cyber-Surveillance 
Controls Promoting Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 
Globally. 
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technology and privacy within the EU borders through health 
tracking phone apps.
In sum, as China always pursues comprehensive and 
consistent long-term strategies, Europe also should fine-tune 
its somewhat idiosyncratic relations with Beijing into a more 
consistent strategy and start acting with a long-term outlook.
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